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ABSTRACT 
The overall capacity of an airport is determined by the airfield, particularly the 
runway system. The demand for runway access at major airports is expected 
to eventually exceed the capacity of the existing runway systems. The lack of 
adequate runway capacity at an airport results in congestion and expensive 
delays. Airport authorities, in response, plan to make significant investments 
on new runways where possible. There is consensus amongst researchers 
that the lack of adequate runway capacity cannot only be addressed by 
building additional capacity. Innovative ways which aim for better utilisation of 
existing facilities should be considered. Therefore, the research question is 
posed: Can demand management be successfully applied to defer capital 
expenditure. A detailed literature review of international best practices and 
analysis of their suitability is undertaken using ORTIA as a case study. The 
literature review identified: collaborative decision making; air and rail 
integration; demand management and technological improvements as likely 
interventions. The most significant finding of this research report is that the 
capacity of a runway system can be improved by implementing these 
measures. 
 
 
 
Keywords: ORT International Airport; runway congestion; demand 
management. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
Runway capacity is a fundamental topic to modern airport planning and 
design because it is the capacity of the airfield and specifically of the runway 
system that determines the ultimate capacity of an airport. The runway  
system is in most cases the primary “bottle-neck” of the air traffic 
management system because it is at the runway and its immediate vicinity 
that air traffic transitions from three-dimensional flows in air-space to the 
“single file” regime that must be followed for runway operations. It is a difficult 
and time consuming task to increase substantially the capacity of the runway 
system of an airport. New runways, along with associated protection zones, 
noise buffer space, require acquisition of a large amount of additional land 
area with significant capital investment (De Neufville and Odoni 2003:396). 
New runways have significant environmental and other external impacts that 
require long and complicated review-and-approval processes with uncertain 
outcomes.  
In contrast, the capacity of the landside facilities (passenger and cargo 
terminals, road access etc.) and of other airfield facilities (taxiways, apron 
stands) can in most instances be increased, in one way or another, to equal 
or exceed the capacity of the runway system. Airport capacity and delay has 
received a significant amount of attention, from airport professionals and the 
public at large, as airport traffic delays have increased. Some airport 
stakeholders believe that the most significant threat to the long-term 
sustainability of the global air transportation system is the inability of runway 
2 
 
 
capacity to keep up with growing air traffic demand at many of the world’s 
most important airports (De Neufville and Odoni 2003:397). 
The solutions advocated by airport operators and airlines are to build 
additional facilities at congested airports or to find ways to make more 
efficient use of existing facilities. The efficient use of existing facilities is 
considered as a better option because it requires less capital investment and 
avoids many of the challenges related to increasing the size of the airport and 
infringing on the surrounding communities at airports where available airport 
land has been developed. A third course advocated is not to increase 
capacity but to manage demand by channelling it to off-peak times or to 
alternative sites. The rationale underlying all these approaches is that 
capacity and demand must somehow be brought into equilibrium in order to 
prevent or reduce delay (Wells 2000:239-240). 
From a South African context, since 1994, Airports Company South Africa 
(ACSA) has invested in excess of 30 billion Rand at ORTIA on improving 
existing airport infrastructure and on additional capacity. Since 2010, the 
focus has shifted from adding new facilities to utilising existing facilities in a 
more efficient manner. Despite these efforts, traffic projections indicate that 
by 2017, ACSA will have to invest significant financial resources on additional 
capacity. The investment proposal includes a third runway and an extension 
of the existing secondary runway. To enable these runway developments at 
ORTIA, ACSA will have to acquire a significant amount of privately owned 
land currently used for residential and business purposes. 
South Africa in general and ACSA in particular have not explored what is 
referred to above in this document as the “third course”; to manage demand 
by channelling it to off-peak times or to alternative sites. Another unexplored 
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alternative, which is introduced in the literature review, is air/rail integration. 
These approaches to capacity management are the focus of this research 
report.      
1.2 Objectives 
The objective of this research report is to conduct a case study of the impact 
of demand management approaches advocated internationally as an 
alternative to the construction of additional runway capacity at ORTIA. 
1.2.1 Research question 
From section 1.1, the solutions adopted for resolving airport congestion are to 
build additional facilities, or find ways to make more efficient use of existing 
facilities. These measures are aimed towards managing the supply side. 
Another solution aimed towards managing the demand side is not to increase 
capacity but to manage demand by channelling it off-peak or to alternative 
sites and/or other transport modes. Therefore the following research question 
is posed: 
Can demand management be applied to defer capital expenditure for 
new runways at airports such as ORTIA?   
1.3 Methodology 
The following steps are undertaken in this study: 
 Defining the objectives and a research question to focus the research 
and to enable the author to work towards a specific goal; 
 Undertaking a literature review of international approaches to 
addressing the aircraft delay and runway congestion issues as well as 
external issues that could affect the findings of this research report; 
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 Undertaking a case study of the various approaches advocated in 
literature to addressing aircraft delay and runway congestion. 
 Analysing impact and feasibility of the various approach from the 
ORTIA Context. 
1.4 Deliverables 
A research report containing the following: 
 A literature review detailing the extent of aircraft delays and runway 
congestion and the alternative approaches to addressing the problem; 
 A case study analysing the impact of alternative approaches to 
addressing aircraft delays and runway congestion from a South African 
context; 
 Recommendations regarding suitability of the alternative approaches 
to the South African context. 
1.5 Scope 
The literature review focuses mainly on published work with unpublished work 
consulted only when no published work is available on the subject. The 
research focuses mainly on congestion resulting from lack of adequate 
runway capacity. 
1.6 Structure of the report 
Chapter 2 of the report describes the existing academic literature on 
alternative methods of addressing airport congestion and the associated 
delays. Chapter 3 gives an overview of the global trends in aviation traffic 
development and highlights the expected traffic growth at ORTIA. Chapter 4 
provides an evaluation of the suitability of the various demand management 
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approach to different airport settings. Chapter 5 describes impediments to the 
implementation of congestion pricing. Chapter 6 describes existing facilities at 
ORTIA and outline the airport’s runway development strategy. Chapter 7 
discusses the ORTIA case study and Chapter 8 details conclusions and 
makes recommendations on further research work.   
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Background 
This chapter describes the impact of the approaches discussed in the 
literature on runway congestion in general, with specific focus on those that 
could inform a study of ORTIA and similar airports. According to Poldy 
(1982:3), capacity gains through the construction of new airports or the 
expansion of existing facilities are considerably expensive; have long lead 
time; are subject to social and political objections. Furthermore, these 
negatives are more pronounced in respect of runway developments than any 
other airport sub-system. This research report, therefore, focuses on non-
infrastructure interventions aimed at enhancing the capacity of the runway 
system. 
The demand for access to the runway system at ORTIA is expected to 
continue to grow from the current peak demand of 51 peak hour movements 
to approximately 80 peak hour movements by year 2022. Demand is 
expected to also start “filling-up” the low demand hours of the day between 
07:00 in the morning till 19:00 in the evening. Similar to other international 
airports, ORTIA has two distinct morning and evening peaks. These peaks 
are driven by: international arrivals; domestic and regional departure in the 
morning and international departure; domestic and regional arrivals in the 
evening. The average demand in between the peak periods is expected to 
grow from an average 40 movements to approximately 65 movements by 
year 2022 (ACI 2010). 
To accommodate the expected demand, ACSA plans to invest in excess of 
R3 billion on a new runway and associated taxiways and navigational aids. 
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The new runway will be accompanied by a 1000 meter northward extension 
of the existing secondary runway. A fourth runway is planned beyond year 
2022. To accommodate these developments, ACSA will need to acquire 
extensive privately owned land within the vicinity of ORTIA (ACSA 2010). 
Although in the long term, the need to construct new runways cannot be 
completely removed, the literature indicates four basic alternative approaches 
to relieving runway congestion in the short to medium term: collaborative 
decision making; technological improvements; air and rail integration; and 
demand management. The effectiveness of each approach in addressing 
runway congestion and its implementation challenges are evaluated. The 
scope of this research report is confined to the runway subsystem of the 
airport. 
The role of an airport is to provide an interface between the air and surface 
phases of an overall transportation network. An airport provides a variety of 
facilities to meet the demands associated with the movement of aircraft, 
vehicles, passengers and freight. The concentration of airport facilities in a 
relatively small area, and the focussing of the air and surface movements on 
that area, have made airport capacity one of the key issues to be addressed if 
the growing demand for air transportation is to be met. Air transportation has 
experienced sustained growth over the last two decades. This growth was 
fuelled by among other things the growth of the global economy (Poldy 1982). 
The capacity on an airport is determined by a number of systems: access 
roads, terminal building, aircraft stands, runways and taxiways. In most 
airports, the capacity of all these facilities except for the runways can be 
relatively easily increased. This research is therefore concerned with one 
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aspect of airport capacity, the ability of the runway system to meet the 
demand for aircraft movements.  
As the demand approaches the capacity of the runways, congestion 
increases, and costly delays are experienced by aircraft on the ground and in 
the air. 
2.1.1 Objectives of the Literature Review 
In an attempt to gain a broader understanding into the subject of airport 
congestion in general, and demand management in particular, a study of 
international methods and best practices covering this subject needs to be 
undertaken. The literature investigated describes the following: 
 Runway capacity problems associated with aircraft delay; 
 Factors affecting runway capacity and aircraft delay; 
 Demand and demand management; 
 Problems associated with demand management application; 
 Alternative approaches to providing airport capacity.  
Furthermore, a review of international and local trends and events which 
could affect the implementation of demand management approach, identified 
through this research, is necessary to ensure that the outputs are applicable 
for use in coming years.  
2.1.2 Type of Literature Reviewed 
The literature review focuses on published work, with unpublished work 
referred to only where no published work is available on the subject. The 
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following bodies of literature were reviewed to meet the objectives described 
in section 2.1.1: 
 Technical handbooks, journals and design manuals detailing 
international methods and standards used to determine aircraft delay, 
runway capacity and runway demand at major airports; 
 Journals detailing alternative approaches to providing airport capacity; 
 Reports from Air Transport and Navigation Services (ATNS), ACSA 
and International Air Transport Association (IATA) to determine current 
operating airside and airspace operating procedures. 
The findings of each of these bodies of literature are discussed below. 
Section 2.2 discusses problems associated with aircraft delays and the lack of 
adequate airport capacity. Section 2.3 discusses the characteristics of aircraft 
delays. Sections 2.4 and 2.5 discuss the concept of runway capacity and the 
factors that affect runway capacity respectively. Section 2.6 discusses 
alternative approaches to address the lack of runway capacity. Section 2.7 
discusses in detail the concept of demand management.   
2.1.3 Sources of Literature Reviewed  
From section 2.1.1 the objective of this literature review is to gain a broader 
understanding into the subject of airport congestion in general, and demand 
management, in particular. This is necessary to guide and ensure that the 
method proposed in this report for Oliver Reginald Tambo International 
Airport (ORTIA) is aligned with current thinking. No locally produced literature 
exists regarding the aforementioned topic: international literature has 
therefore been consulted. The following technical references have been 
reviewed: 
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 Airport Systems:  Planning, Design and Management (De Neufville and 
Odoni 2003); 
 Planning and Design of Airports (Horonjeff and Mckelvey 1994); 
 Airport Engineering (Ashford and Wright 1992); 
 Airport Planning & Management (Wells 2000); 
 Airport Runway Capacity and Delay: Some Models for Planners and 
Managers (Poldy 1982). 
 Journals on alternative approaches to addressing airport congestion. 
2.2 Aircraft Delays and Capacity Problem 
Problems associated with aircraft delays and with the lack of adequate airport 
capacity are well documented in literature. Airport congestion is a growing 
concern with the potential of negatively affecting the entire global air traffic 
network. There is also general consensus that this problem cannot and 
should not only be addressed by simply building additional capacity or 
completely new airport. Innovative ways in addition to building new capacity, 
which aim for better utilisation of the existing facility should be considered.   
The consequences of the lack of adequate airside capacity at an airport are 
delays to landings and takeoffs and their related economic and other costs. 
When delays become large, other negative results such as missed flight 
connections, flight cancellations and flight diversions to other airports can 
also become increasingly common (Poldy 1982).  
De Neufville and Odoni (2003:436) explain that airport and air traffic 
congestion is a growing problem on an international scale and is widely 
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considered one of the principal constraints to the future growth of the global 
air transportation industry.  
2.3 Characteristics of Aircraft Delay 
Wells (2000:240) defines delay as the difference between the time an 
operation actually takes place and the time that it would have taken place 
under uncongested conditions without interference from other aircraft. Flights 
cannot be started or completed on schedule because of the line of aircraft 
awaiting their turn for takeoff, landing or use of taxiways and gates at terminal 
buildings. He suggest that the cause of delay is a lack of capacity, meaning 
that the airport does not have facilities such as runways, taxiways, or gates in 
sufficient number to accommodate all those who want to use the airport at 
peak periods of demand. 
Figure 2-1 indicates diagrammatically the weekday demand profile at Boston 
Logan International Airport (BOS) and compares it with three different levels 
of maximum throughput capacity, labelled “high”, “medium” and “low”. (See 
2.4 for the definitions of runway capacity.) According to De Neufville and 
Odoni (2003:438), the demand profile has two peaks, typical of many busy 
airports with large volumes of business traffic. The number of movements 
scheduled in an hour is not always the same as the number of movements 
that will actually be requested during that hour. 
De Neufville and Odoni (2003) attributes this to mechanical or logistical 
problems with aircraft, flight cancellations, late boarding passengers, late 
arriving crews and delays at other airports. The number of movements 
actually requested at a given airport during any particular period of time will 
fluctuate around the number scheduled. They observe the following about the 
delays associated with each of the three levels of capacity: queues of landing 
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and departing aircraft will form and delays will occur during those periods of a 
day when the demand rate exceeds the capacity for any significant time 
interval. This is because airport users will seek to use the runway system at a 
rate greater than the system’s capacity.  
They observe that when the capacity is “low”, delays keep building up 
throughout the day. Aircraft scheduled to arrive or depart during the afternoon 
and evening hours may be subject to long delays. Due to the size of the 
expected delays, airlines would cancel a number of flights to this airport. 
 If there is an interval of time T during which the demand rate continually 
exceeds the service rate, then both the expected length of the aircraft queue 
and the expected waiting time per aircraft during that interval will increase in 
direct proportion to T and to the difference between the demand rate and 
capacity during T (De Neufville and Odoni 2003:439). This may include days 
during which the demand rate is less than the capacity for the entire day, as 
is the case when the capacity is at a “high” level in Figure 2-1. Such delays 
are due primarily to the variability of the time intervals between successive 
requests for use of the runways, as well as to the variability of the time it 
takes to process (“serve”) each landing and takeoff. 
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Figure 2-1: Weekday demand profile at Boston/Logan airport. De 
Neufville and Odoni (2003:438) 
They identify the sources of this variability as: 
 The time instants at which demands (arrivals and, especially 
departures) are scheduled to take place are not evenly spaced, but are 
“bunched together” around certain times (e.g. “on-the-hour” or “on-the-
half-hour” departure peaks); 
 The time instants at which demand actually occur on a day-to-day 
basis are “randomized” as a result of deviations from schedule due to 
the  reasons  mentioned above (mechanical problems, delays at other 
airports); and  
 The amount of time it takes to serve departures and arrivals on the 
runway system is not constant, but varies with many factors such as 
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type of aircraft, separation requirements from preceding aircraft, 
runway exit used). These factors are discussed in detail in section 2.5.  
The net effect is the presence of time intervals during which “clusters” of 
several closely spaced demands and/or of longer-than-usual service times 
occur. Queues of aircraft will then form on the ground and/or in the air. When 
the demand rate is smaller than the capacity but close to it, the queues may 
take a long time to dissipate. The new clusters of demand or of long service 
times may come along before the previously formed queue has dissipated 
and the waiting line(s) may get longer for a while.  The resulting delays are 
referred to as stochastic, to distinguish them from overload delays. Long 
queues may form even if the demand rate is smaller than capacity in cases 
where there is a significant variation in the times between successive 
demands on the runway systems and/or in the service times at the runway 
system and the demand rate is close to the runway system’s capacity (De 
Neufville and Odoni 2003:440).  
Wells (2000) agrees with De Neufville and Odoni (2003) that aircraft arrive 
and depart at a non-uniform rate, meaning that delay can occur even when 
demand is low in relation to capacity. The probability of simultaneous need for 
service increases rapidly with traffic density, so that the average delay per 
aircraft increases exponentially as demand approaches throughput capacity. 
Figure 2-2 indicates the relationship between practical and throughput 
capacity (practical and throughput capacity are defined in section 2.4). As 
demand approaches the limit of throughput capacity, delays increase 
exponentially and in theory become infinite when demand equals or exceeds 
throughput capacity (Wells 2000:244). 
15 
 
 
 
Figure 2-2: Relationship between throughput and practical capacity. 
Wells (2000:244) 
Figure 2-3 indicates a typical distribution of delays encountered by aircraft at 
a particular level of demand. Most delays are of short duration, however, 
even though the average delay is relatively low (five minutes), there are 
several aircraft encountering relatively long delays of fifteen minutes or more, 
thus, while practical capacity is normally specified as the level of operations 
that, on average, will result in a given amount of delay, the average implies 
that some percentage of delays will be considerably longer (Wells 2000:244). 
 
Figure 2-3: Typical probability distribution of aircraft delay. Wells 
(2000:245)  
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Wells (2000:245) considers the question of how much delay is acceptable, 
which he argues is a judgement involving the following factors: some delay is 
unavoidable because it occurs for reasons beyond anyone’s control, such as 
wind direction, weather, aircraft performance characteristics, the randomness 
of demand for services; some delay, although avoidable, might be too 
expensive to eliminate in instances when the cost of remedial measures 
exceeds the potential benefit. Even with the most vigorous and successful 
effort, the random nature of delay means that there will always be some 
aircraft encountering delay greater than the “acceptable” length. Acceptable 
delay is in essence a policy decision about the tolerability of delay being 
longer than a specified amount, taking into account the technical feasibility 
and economic practicality of available remedies. 
2.4  Runway Capacity 
There are several measures of runway capacity all of them intended to 
provide an estimate of how many aircraft movements can be performed on 
the runway system of an airport during some specified unit of time. From a 
long-term perspective, runway capacity is a probabilistic quantity, a random 
variable, which can take on different values at different times, depending on 
the circumstances involved. The most fundamental measure of runway 
capacity, maximum throughput capacity or saturation capacity is defined as 
the expected number of movements that can be performed in one hour on a 
runway system without violating Air Traffic Management (ATM) rules, 
assuming continuous aircraft demand (De Neufville and Odoni 2003:370). 
De Neufville and Odoni (2003) highlight the following points about this 
definition. First, in order to compute the maximum throughput capacity, one 
needs to know the specific conditions under which runway operations are 
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conducted. This means specifying the ATM separation requirements in force, 
the mix of aircraft, the mix of movements (arrival and departures), the 
allocation of movements among the runways (if the runway system consists 
of more than one runway), and several other factors described in section 2.5. 
Secondly, the definition of maximum throughput capacity makes no reference 
to any level-of-service (LOS) requirements. It only considers the number of 
aircraft movements that can be processed on average per hour, if the runway 
system is utilized to its maximum potential in the presence of “continuous 
aircraft demand”.  
The practical hourly capacity (PHCAP) is defined as the expected number of 
movements that can be performed in one hour on a runway system with an 
average delay per movement of four minutes.  
This definition specifies a threshold value for acceptable LOS (“average delay 
of four minutes per movement”) and states that the runway system “reaches 
its capacity” when that threshold is exceeded.  
The sustained capacity of a runway system is the number of movements per 
hour that can be reasonably sustained over a period of several hours. 
“Reasonably sustained” refers to the workload of the ATM system and of the 
traffic controllers. The rationale is that, to achieve maximum throughput 
capacity, the ATM system should work to its full potential all the time. 
However, operations at such a level of full efficiency and maximum 
performance cannot be sustained in practice for periods of more than one or 
two consecutive hours (De Neufville and Odoni 2003:371). 
The declared capacity is defined as the number of aircraft movements per 
hour that an airport can accommodate at a reasonable LOS. Delay is used as 
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the principal indicator of LOS. Declared capacity is widely used especially in 
connection with “schedule coordination” and the allocation of “slots” at 
congested airports. Under this practice, each airport that experiences 
congestion “declares” a capacity, which is then used to set a limit on the 
number of movements per hour that can be scheduled at this airport (De 
Neufville and Odoni 2003:373). This method is adopted and utilised by ACSA, 
however, there is no agreement on the acceptable level of service among the 
various airport stakeholders. 
According to them there is no generally accepted definition of declared 
capacity and no standard methodology for setting it. It is up to local or 
national airport and civil aviation organisations, in cooperation with other 
interested parties, to compute and set the declared capacity.  
The approaches used for this purpose vary from country to country and even 
from airport to airport. This has long been a point of contention between 
ACSA and ATNS as ACSA is of the view that the declared capacity of ORTIA 
is on the conservative side.  
This view is supported by literature on airports of similar traffic size, physical 
and environmental constraint, fleet mix and available infrastructure.  
2.5 Factors Affecting Runway Capacity  
De Neufville and Odoni (2003:376) provide an overview of these factors and 
of the way in which each affects runway capacity. These are: 
 Number and geometric layout of the runways; 
 Separation requirements between aircraft imposed by the ATM 
system; 
 Visibility, cloud ceiling and precipitation; 
19 
 
 
 Wind direction and strength; 
 Mix of aircraft using the airport; 
 Mix of movements on each runway (arrivals only, departures only, or 
mixed) and sequencing of movements; 
 Type and location of taxiway exits from the runway(s); 
 State and performance of the ATM system;  
 Noise-related and other environmental considerations and constraints.  
Wells (2000:245) agrees that the capacity of an airfield is not constant over 
time; it varies during the day or the year as a result of physical and 
operational factors. According to him, when a figure is given for airfield 
capacity, it is an average based either on some assumed range of conditions 
or on actual operating experience.  
He argues that it is the variability of capacity, rather than its average value, 
that is more detrimental to the overall operation of an airfield. Much of the 
strategy for successful management of an airfield involves devising ways to 
compensate for factors that, individually or in combination, act to lower 
capacity or to induce delay. De Neufville and Odoni (2003) give details of the 
ways in which each factor affects runway capacity as discussed below. 
2.5.1 Number and geometric layout of the runways 
The most important factor influencing a runway system’s capacity is the 
number of runways at the airport and their geometric layout. From a practical 
point of view, a guaranteed method to achieve an increase in the capacity of 
an airport is by constructing a well-designed runway. However, in modern 
times, adding a new runway is a task that ranges from “very difficult” to 
“nearly impossible” at most of the world’s busiest and most congested airports 
(De Neufville and Odoni 2003:377). 
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2.5.2 ATM Separation requirements 
ATM systems specify a set of required minimum separations between aircraft 
flying under instrument flight rules (IFR). The purpose of these rules is to 
ensure safety.  In turn, the separation requirements determine the maximum 
number of aircraft that can traverse each part of the airspace or can use a 
runway system per unit of time. In the United States, the required separation 
distances between aircraft operating under IFR at major airports are the least 
conservative anywhere in the world. This reflects the need to maximise airport 
capacity, as well as the proficiency and training of their air traffic controllers.  
 Several large European airports have also come to operate in recent years 
with separation requirements that are identical to those used at the busiest 
airports in the United States. Such conservative separation requirements 
recognize the need for more capacity at these airports and have been made 
possible by the improvements in ATM capabilities that have been developed 
there (De Neufville and Odoni 2003:377-378). 
ATNS have indicated that they are in a process reviewing their operational 
procedures with a view of shortening the required separation distances. This 
is intended to improve the capacity of the existing runway system.  
2.5.2.1 Separation requirements for aircraft operating to/from the same 
runway 
The longitudinal separation requirements for aircraft landing on or departing 
from the same runway are important in determining runway capacity. Each 
type of aircraft is assigned to a number of classes according to the aircraft 
size and/or weight. The separation requirements are then specified in unit of 
distance or of time (De Neufville and Odoni 2003:278). 
21 
 
 
Each set of requirements gives the minimum separation that must be 
maintained at all times between two aircraft operating successively on the 
runway as shown in Figure 2-4. The requirements are specified for every 
possible pair of classes and every possible sequence of movements: “arrival 
followed by arrival”, A-A; “departure followed by departure”, D-D; “arrival 
followed by departure” A-D; and “departure followed by arrival”, D-A. 
In the United States, the FAA assigns all aircraft to three classes, according 
to their maximum certified takeoff weight (MTOW): heavy (H), large (L) and 
small (S). Aircraft with: 
 MTOW greater than 116 tons are in class H; 
 MTOW between 19 tons and 116 tons are in L; 
 MTOW less than 19 tons are in S; 
 The Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) also identifies the Boeing 757, 
whose MTOW places it at the borderline between the L and H classes, 
as an aircraft class by itself.  
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Figure 2-4: Single runway IFR separation requirements in the United 
States in 2000. De Neufville and Odoni (2003:380)  
2.5.2.2 Separation requirements for aircraft operating to/from parallel 
runways    
The separation requirements for aircraft landing on or departing from a pair of 
parallel runways play a critical role at those major airports that operate with 
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more than one active runway. Most of these multi-runway airports rely on 
operations to and from parallel runways (De Neufville and Odoni 2003:384). 
As indicated in section 6.3, ORTIA has a two runway system. 
The FAA summarizes the separation requirements for operations on parallel 
runways under Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) as described Table 2-1. The 
“arrival/arrival” column refers to the required separation between a pair of 
arriving aircraft, the first of which is landing on one of the parallel runways and 
the second on the other. 
Table 2-1: IFR separation requirements between aircraft movements on 
parallel runways in the United States. De Neufville and Odoni (2003:384) 
Separation 
between 
runway 
centrelines 
Arrival/ 
arrival 
Departures/ 
Departures 
Arrival/ 
departure 
Departures/ 
Arrival 
Up to 762m 
As in single 
runway 
As in single 
runway 
Arrival 
touches down 
Departure is 
clear of 
runway 
762 - 1310m 1.5 nmi independent independent Independent 
1310m or 
more 
independent independent Independent Independent 
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Similarly, “departure/arrival” refers to the situation in which the first aircraft in 
the pair will depart from one of the parallel runways and the second will land 
on the other. The “departure/departure” and arrival/departure” columns in 
Table 2-1 should be interpreted in a similar way.  
2.5.3 Visibility, ceiling, and precipitation 
Cloud ceiling and visibility are the two parameters that determine the weather 
category in which an airport operates at any given time (De Neufville and 
Odoni 2003:388). Figure 2-5 indicates the various operating procedures for 
varying cloud ceiling and visibility. 
 
 
2.5.4 Wind direction and strength 
A runway can be used only when crosswinds are within prescribed limits and 
tail winds do not exceed nine to eleven km/h. This means that the orientation 
of runway operations and the combination of the active runways depend on 
Figure 2-5: A typical classification of weather conditions at an airport 
in the United States. De Neufville and Odoni (2003:388)     
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the direction and strength of the prevailing winds at any given time. At 
locations that experience strong winds from several different directions at 
different times, this can be the cause of considerable variability in the 
available capacity of the runway system (De Neufville and Odoni 2003:391). 
2.5.5 Mix of aircraft 
A homogeneous mix of aircraft or a mix consisting of one or two dominant 
classes of aircraft is preferable to a non-homogeneous mix from the point of 
view of runway capacity. A homogeneous mix also offers advantages for ATM 
purposes, as it simplifies the work of air traffic controllers, who have to make 
fewer adjustments for wake vortex separations of varying magnitudes, for 
different approach speeds, and for other aircraft characteristics. When the mix 
of aircraft is very non-homogeneous, air traffic controllers at multi-runway 
airports often attempt to “segregate traffic” by assigning different aircraft 
classes to different runways (De Neufville and Odoni 2003:393). 
The traffic mix at ORTIA can be considered as non-homogeneous with a 
relatively high percentage of class L and S. These classes have a significant 
portion of “slow” turboprops. The capacity of two independent parallel 
runways, if operated well by the ATM system, can provide more than twice 
the capacity of a single runway. The two runways provide an opportunity to 
optimise the assignment of aircraft types to each runway, as well as the mix 
and sequencing of movements (landing and/or departures) on each runway. 
2.5.6 Mix and sequencing of movements 
The mix of movements (arrivals versus departures) at the airport as a whole, 
and on each runway separately affects the capacity of the runway. For most 
ATM systems the separation requirements are such that the capacity of a 
runway that is used only for departures is higher than the capacity of a 
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runway that is use only for arrivals, given the same mix of aircraft. At some 
airports in the United States more than 60 departures may be performed in 
one hour from a single runway when the traffic mix includes a relatively small 
percentage of wide body aircraft (class H).  
In contrast, it is difficult to perform more than 45 arrivals per hour per runway 
with similar aircraft mix. At airports with more than one active runway, air 
traffic controllers often use separate runways for arrivals and for departures 
(De Neufville and Odoni 2003:394). ATNS primarily uses separate runways 
for arrivals and departures specifically during peak periods at ORTIA. The 
main departure runway is used for arrivals when there are no departures or 
the number of departures is low. 
The use of runways for arrivals or departures may simplify ATM operations, 
but is not optimal as far as overall airport capacity is concerned. It may 
overload one runway and underutilize another at times when the number of 
arrivals differs significantly from the number of departures. This may also 
create a serious imbalance between the delays experienced by arrivals 
versus those experienced by departures.  
A better way to operate an airport with two parallel runways, when feasible, is 
to assign some arrivals to a runway used primarily for departures, whenever 
arrivals “overflow” their primary runway, and do the reverse whenever there is 
an excess of departures in the mix. It may be even more efficient to mix 
arrivals and departures on two or more runways at airports where the ATM 
system is sufficiently advanced to sustain this mode of operation well (De 
Neufville and Odoni 2003:394). 
At ORTIA, the main arrival runway is approximately 1000 meters shorter than 
the main departure runway. This (main arrival) runway is also located 
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approximately three kilometres from the passenger terminal building making it 
unattractive for departure operations. The sequencing of movements on a 
runway also influences runway capacity, especially whenever a runway is 
used for mixed operations (arrivals and departures). Arriving aircraft are 
sequenced in roughly First Come First Serve (FCFS) order for access to a 
runway, and so are departing aircraft. Air traffic controllers, however, have 
latitude regarding the sequencing of arrivals versus departures on the 
runway.  
Controllers can maintain an approximate FCFS discipline and sequence 
arrivals versus departures roughly according to the time when they can first 
make use of the runway, the earlier the time, the higher the priority given. 
Arrivals are given priority over departures for reasons of safety, controller 
workload and aircraft operating cost. Air traffic controllers process a string of 
several consecutive landings until the queue of arriving aircraft is exhausted 
and will then process a string of several consecutive departures. They will 
also look for some “free departures” and will try to insert one or more 
departures between two arrivals without disturbing the arrival stream and, 
thus, without reducing the arrival processing rate (De Neufville and Odoni 
2003:395). 
There are also occasions when a long queue of departures may form on the 
ground because the runway is continually busy with arrivals. In such 
instances, ATC may decide to interrupt the arrival stream for a while, 
assigning temporary priority to takeoffs until the departure queue returns to a 
reasonable length. Alternating arrivals and departures on the runway can be 
a very effective strategy for maximising overall runway capacity, as measured 
by the total number of movements per unit of time. This sequencing strategy 
can be implemented by “stretching”, as necessary, the separation between a 
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pair of consecutive arriving aircraft, in order to create a gap that is just 
sufficiently long to allow insertion of a departure between two arrivals. 
ATM separation requirements make it possible to achieve such insertions with 
only a modest amount of stretching of the required A-A separations. Thus, by 
“sacrificing” only a modest arrival capacity per unit of time, the number of 
departures served by the runway per hour becomes roughly equal to the 
number of arrivals. However, this type of separation-stretching procedure is 
more demanding from the ATM point of view and requires skilled air traffic 
controller teams (De Neufville and Odoni 2003:396). 
2.5.7 Type and location of runway exits 
The runway occupancy time of an arriving aircraft is defined as the time 
between the instant the aircraft touches down on the runway and the instant it 
is on a runway exit, with all parts of the aircraft clear of the runway. The 
location of runway exits plays a significant role in determining runway 
occupancy times. Correctly designed and located high speed exit taxiways 
are an effective way of reducing runway occupancy (De Neufville and Odoni 
2003:396).   
At ORTIA, a total of three high speed exit taxiways were constructed (one per 
landing runway). The benefits of these taxiways has not been fully achieved 
or demonstrated.    
2.5.8 State and performance of the ATM systems 
According to De Neufville and Odoni (2003:397) a high-quality ATM system 
with well-trained and motivated personnel is a fundamental prerequisite (but 
not a sufficient condition by itself) for achieving high runway capacities.  
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2.5.9 Noise considerations 
Environmental considerations, especially noise impact, exert influence in 
determining runway system capacity at a number of airports. In the daily 
course of airport operations, noise is one of the principal criteria used by air 
traffic controllers to decide which runway configurations to activate.  
Noise-related considerations work, in general, as a constraint on airport 
capacity, since they tend to reduce the frequency with which certain high-
capacity configurations may be used (De Neufville and Odoni 2003:397). In 
South Africa, there is currently no legislation restricting the impact of aircraft 
noise. 
2.6 Alternative Solutions to the Lack of Airport Runway 
Capacity  
This section discusses the various strategies proposed in literature to address 
lack of airport runway capacity.  
2.6.1 Broad Overview  
According to Hamzawi (1992:47) the solution to airport congestion should 
focus on finding ways of reducing the ratio of demand to capacity and that 
this could be achieved by increasing the capacity, reducing or limiting 
demand, or by both methods.  
His proposed solutions to the airport congestion problem are structured along 
this line of reasoning and are outline in Figure 2-6. 
Although developing new airports or expanding the existing ones directly 
increases the system capacity, it should be recognised that in an era of 
economic restraint, constraints on capital expenditures and growing 
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community resistance to developing new airports, have made it necessary to 
consider other alternatives including: low-capital capacity expansion options; 
management of traffic demand and peaking; and increased application of 
technology (Hamzawi 1992:47).  
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Figure 2-6: Options for balancing airport capacity and demand. Hamzawi 
(1992:49) 
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2.6.2 Improvements to slot allocation rules 
A “slot” is an important aspect of runway capacity. Based on IATA and EU 
rules, a slot is the scheduled time of departure or arrival available or allocated 
to an aircraft movement at a specific date at capacity-constrained airports. 
Capacity constrained airports are referred to as slot controlled, slot restricted, 
slot constrained, or slot coordinated airports. A slot is effectively “permission 
to schedule a flight at a particular airport at a particular time”, it is not an 
absolute right given the potential for delays due to bad weather, airspace 
congestion, or ground handling problems. Slots exist only at slot-constrained 
airports where the demand for flights has outgrown existing runway capacity 
or supply (Bass 1994:145). 
Historically, the allocation of airport runway slots has been administered by 
the airlines through IATA. Initially, the airlines convene to discuss inter-airline 
connections through IATA scheduling committees. These committees were 
administered by major airlines at each airport and operated based on 
Scheduling Procedures Guide published by IATA. The original objectives of 
the Scheduling Committees were to improve inter-airline connections among 
participating carriers and countries.  
The objectives gradually changed as airlines began to experience difficulty 
obtaining slots at congested airports. At that time, price was never considered 
as a mechanism to ration demand to limited runway capacity. Instead, the 
allocation mechanism adopted by IATA was a process of administrative 
rationing where slot allocation is managed through twice-yearly IATA 
conferences. At the meetings, slots are administratively allocated by an 
independent coordinator working under the basic principles of “grandfather 
rights” and effective use (Debbage 2002:937). 
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According to Bass (1994:146): 
“The basic principle of grandfather rights is that an airline that held and 
used a slot last year is entitled to do so again in the same season the 
following year. Effective use means that preference is given to an 
airline that plans to use a slot more intensively: for example, a daily 
service rather than one that is less than daily, or a service that 
operates throughout the season rather than only in the peak”.  
The IATA system is not without problems. The principle of effective use 
favours daily scheduled carriers over less frequent. Less than optimal slots 
are made available to less frequent carriers. It has been suggested that the 
principle of “grandfather rights” is anticompetitive as it serves to advantage 
incumbents over new entrants. In response to this criticism, IATA modified the 
scheduling guidelines where half of all slots that become newly available are 
to be first offered to new entrants (defined as any airline with less than four 
slots per day at the slot-coordinated airport in question). IATA also introduced 
a “use-it-or-lose-it” rule to minimise slot hoarding by the dominant airlines 
where those not used 80% of the time within a two month period are 
relinquished and put back into a pool to be reallocated to other carriers, 
including new entrants (Debbage 2002:938). 
According to Debbage (2002:938), in February 1993, the European 
Commission introduced Regulation 95/93 in an attempt to establish common 
rules for the allocation of slots at its slot-constrained airports. An 
administrative process based on “neutral, transparent and non-discriminatory 
rules” was established to facilitate competition and encourage entry into the 
air transport market. However, the EU guidelines mostly endorsed existing 
IATA procedures relating to slot allocations. Regulation 95/93 recognised the 
historical merit of slot usage or “grandfather rights” whereby an airline 
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inherited the option to a slot if it had already made use of the runway at the 
same time during the preceding equivalent season. Furthermore, policies 
relating to new entrants, the establishment of an independent slot coordinator 
and secondary trading are marginal deviations from existing IATA guidelines.  
According to Langner (1996a:72), the only real difference between EU 
regulation and the IATA mechanism is that the latter relies on mutual 
agreements, whereas the EU regulation is a binding legal framework.  
The EU 95/93 established a mandatory slot pool which included newly 
created, unused and/or returned slots, with half of all these to be reallocated 
to new entrants. However, a UK Civil Aviation Authority (1995) investigation of 
slot practices at Heathrow Airport in 1994 indicated that 95% of all slots were 
reallocated on the basis of “grandfather rights”.  
After the inclusion of newly available slots due to expanded capacity at 
Heathrow, the mandatory slot pool only accounted for seven to eight percent 
of the total. Furthermore, although new entrants could claim up to half of the 
slot pool, they only took up around 20% of the pool, and only 40% of the slots 
in the pool were left unused due to the unattractive timing of the slots. In the 
busiest hours at Heathrow Airport demand continued to exceed the available 
slots by more than 30% in 1994 as shown in Table 2-2, almost two years after 
Regulation 95/93 had been passed by the European Commission. Given the 
difficulties experienced in London and throughout the EU with administrative 
rationing, European policymakers began to pay close attention to the 
American free-market-based slot-trading (Debbage 2002:939). 
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Table 2-2: Heathrow slot capacity and initial demand for peak August 
weekday (1994). UK Civil Aviation Authority (1995)  
According to Langer (1996a) and Starkie (1998), in the United States, the 
IATA-based system of administrative rationing does not apply, mostly for anti-
trust reasons, and slots are allocated on a first come first serve basis at 
nearly all its airports. 
US carriers schedule fights to account for expected delays at the more 
congested airports. At Chicago’s O’Hare, New York’s JFK and La Guardia, 
and Washington’s National as a result of heavy traffic at these airports, a slot 
quota mechanism has been in place since 1968 to limit air traffic congestion 
and noise. The FAA allows domestic slots at these “high density” airports to 
be bought and sold for money, rather than being swapped for other slots as is 
the case in the “one-for-one” trading system established by IATA. The US 
approach to slot trading is in contrast to EU Regulation 95/93 which allows 
slots to be freely exchanged but does not address the issues of price and 
ownership. The “Buy-Sell-Rule” authorized US airlines and other institutions 
to purchase, sell, trade or lease slots pending certain conditions laid down by 
the FAA such as the “use-or-lose” rule and new entrant slot pool (Debbage 
2002:940). 
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The ruling allowed a secondary market in slots to flourish where US airlines 
were allowed to trade historic entitlements to slots. However, they were 
traded through a clearing house operated by the Air Transport Association 
(the US airline trade body), rather than through an independent slot broker 
(Langner 1996b). Consequently, the process was not transparent and the 
financial terms of slot transfers were not made public (Starkie 1998). 
According to Debbage (2002:940) even less clear is the issue of who actually 
owns the slots. The FAA has explicitly ruled that slots do not represent a 
property right for US carriers but instead are an operating privilege subject to 
FAA control. However, the private property status of existing slots has been 
highlighted in a number of transactions. Notably, the public auction of Eastern 
Airlines slots at the four high density airports suggested that slots were airline 
assets rather that FAA or airport assets. A significant number of slots are held 
by non-carriers and some US airlines have mortgaged their slots to financial 
institutions as shown in Table 2-3. 
In Europe, Regulation 95/93 allows slots to be exchanged, although it is less 
clear that money transfers and slot ownership claims by airlines are against 
the rules (Air Transport World 36(5), 199a:11). Despite the ambiguities over 
monetarized trading and slot ownership issues in Europe, industry observers 
believe that the secondary market in airport slots in the United States has 
generated a dynamic and fluid market (Debbage 2002:940-941). 
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Table 2-3: Slot allocations at the four High Density Airport. US General 
Accounting Office (1996) 
 According to Debbage (2002:946), Kleit and Kobayashi (1996) found no 
evidence that dominant carriers at Chicago O’Hare (American and United 
Airlines) were hoarding slots to prevent low-fare new entrants from entering 
the market.  McGowan and Seabright (1989) also examined whether airlines 
with market power might engage in predatory bidding for slots and concluded 
that it is an unnecessarily expensive way to deter or drive-out competitors. 
They argue that it was more likely that incumbents would direct any entry 
deterring or predatory behaviour to the route-specific service they operate 
rather than through the hoarding of slots.  
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Furthermore, Starkie (1998) has suggested that the secondary market in slots 
has encouraged a more efficient use of scarce slots. 
Pre-existing advantages are a concern because monetarized trading was 
introduced based on the grandfather rights of the existing incumbents. This is 
a fundamental problem because the pre-existing slot holders are, in effect, 
granted an unwarranted windfall gain by government. Starkie (1998:115) has 
suggested that a better approach might be to increase the price charged for 
landing aircraft because this act “would have the effect of reducing the 
scarcity rent enjoyed by the incumbent airlines, thus placing incumbent and 
entrant on a more equal footing”. 
According to Janda (1993), in the UK, airport charges are calculated based 
on aircraft weight plus, in some cases, passenger charges and a small 
contribution for aircraft parking. Charging formulas are based on guided lines 
provided by IATA and ICAO. The underlying principle of the guidelines is one 
of recovery costs, where 80% of landing costs are attributed to the effects of 
the aircraft’s landing weight. However, “airport charges are a low and 
constant portion of airline operating costs, four percent worldwide in 1992” 
(Toms 1994:77). 
Although the actual use an airline will make of its slot allocation will be 
significantly influenced by the price the carrier must pay, few airport 
authorities have introduced market-clearing pricing schemes based on the 
market demand for access at various times. Some observers have proposed 
that airports need to introduce a marginal cost pricing system that reflects the 
scarcity of slots during peaks, and is based on a system of market-clearing 
prices. Few airports around the world have introduced peak charges, the 
British Airports Authority (BAA) experiment is the most comprehensive and 
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well-known program in place (Debbage 2002:942). Section 5.2, discusses in 
detail peak pricing schemes that have been implemented and why they failed 
despite being supported by literature. 
Since 1972, the BAA has gradually developed a peak hour landing fee 
scheme for Heathrow and Gatwick that essentially abandoned the weight 
related charge in peak periods. Instead, BAA moved to a fixed runway 
movement charge with a higher landing fee at peak periods to “Reflect the 
higher marginal cost of using scarce runway resources at peak periods,” 
(Doganis 1992:94). Additionally, peak passenger and parking charges were 
also introduced to encourage greater efficiency in the allocation of scarce 
airport resources and to coerce traffic into off-peak periods (Debbage 
2002:943). 
According to Debbage (2002:943), Doganis et al (1990) suggested that some 
evidence exists that BAA peak charge experiment encouraged few carriers to 
reschedule flights to off-peak times. He argues that part of the problem was 
that peak charge prices at Heathrow and Gatwick were still relatively low, and 
thus unlikely to substantially affect airline operations.  
An Institute of Air Transport (1997) study found that on the Heathrow-Rome 
route, peak period airport charges only accounted for 3.1% of the share of the 
price of an economy class airline ticket whereas Gatwick-Rome route 
amounted to only 2.5%. There relatively low prices were put in place because 
of the limitations placed on the BAA by both the government price cap 
regulation and the “single- till” philosophy (Debbage 2002:943). 
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ORTIA is currently classified by ACSA as a slot coordinated airport. ACSA 
has adopted the IATA approach to slot coordination without any deviations. 
No attempt has ever been made to modify the administrative approach to slot 
allocation. From the above description of a slot coordinated airport, this 
classification applies only to airports where the demand for flights has 
outgrown existing runway capacity. From section 6.3, the declared runway 
capacity at ORTIA is 58 movements per hour and from section 3.3 the current 
peak hour demand is 42 movements per hour. ORTIA should therefore not be 
classified as a slot coordinated airport. This could explain ACSA’s somewhat 
casual approach to slot coordination at ORTIA.  
The literature points to the IATA slot allocation approach as a contributor to 
the overall congestion at airports, in particular the principles of “grandfather 
rights” and effective use. IATA recognised that the slot allocation approach 
has short comings and attempted to address these by introducing measures 
such as allocating half of all newly available slots to new entrants and by 
introducing the “use-it-or-lose-it rule”. Despite these measures, congestion at 
major airports continued to increase.  
Literature also points to the methodology used to determine airport charges 
as a contributor to airport congestion. The argument is that the landing fees 
are too low to encourage airlines to efficiently utilise airport slots. Some 
authors have proposed that airports need to introduce a marginal cost pricing 
system that reflects the scarcity of slots during peaks. Moreover scholars 
identify government price cap regulation and the “single till” philosophy as 
contributing factors to airport congestion.  ACSA is a monopoly subject to 
Government Regulations, the regulatory framework prescribes the “single till 
philosophy therefore any attempt to substantially increase airport charges will 
require amendments to the current regulatory framework.   
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2.6.3 Price Based interventions to Congestion Management 
The previous section 2.6.2 outlined the evolution of the slot allocation 
approaches. This section outlines and compared the effectiveness of price 
based slot allocation regimes. 
To address congestion at Chicago’s O’Hare Airport, the FAA took a 
micromanagement approach, prevailing on the airport’s two major carriers 
(United and American) to cut their peak flight volumes while prohibiting 
smaller carriers from adding flights to fill the gap. Similar FAA interventions 
have occurred at New York Airports, where the FAA capped peak hour 
operations while gaining carrier commitments to shift some flights to less-
congested times. The piecemeal nature of the interventions points to a need 
for a more-systematic approach to managing congestion at US airports. In 
recognising this need, the FAA proposals envision a future role for prices as a 
policy tool in attacking the congestion problem. In announcing the New York 
flight caps, the FAA proposed using an auction system to allocate a portion of 
the available slots, with carriers paying for slots instead of receiving them for 
free (Brueckner 2008:1). 
A position paper issued by the US Department of Justice endorsed slot 
auction as a mechanism for addressing airport congestion. Following these 
policy decisions, the FAA changed its rules on landing fees. Landing fees 
traditionally dependent only on aircraft weight, the new rules allow the fees to 
vary by time of day. This change permits airports to implement congestion 
pricing, with high landing fees charged during peak hours and lower fees 
charged in off-peak periods.  
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According to Brueckner (2008) with these new developments, price-based 
solutions to airport congestion have gained credibility, mirroring progress in 
implementing congestion pricing for roads (London and Stockholm are 
prominent examples). He argues that the FAA’s decisions allow different 
pricing approaches. Slot auction is one option, another approach involves a 
slot-sale regime, where the airport authority sets a slot price and allows 
carriers to purchase as many slots as they wish at that price. 
Under congestion pricing, carriers pay a congestion toll that is analogous to 
the slot price, but under an ideal structure, tolls are carrier specific (depending 
on airport flight shares) rather than uniform. By contrast, under a slot trading 
regime, the airport authority distributes slots to the carriers, who trade them at 
uniform price. The current system at slot constrained airports, where carriers 
can sell, or lease the slots in bilateral trades, approximates such a regime, but 
the current low trading volume suggests a need for institutional 
improvements. Given the importance of airport congestion as a policy 
problem, it is important to understand the potential different impacts of these 
price based regimes.  
Brueckner (2008:2) attempts to achieve such an understanding by comparing 
the outcomes achieved under congestion pricing, a slot-sale regime and a 
slot auction.  The difference between a slot-sale regime and congestion 
pricing arises because of internalisation of airport congestion, which occurs 
because carriers at congested airports mostly operate a large number of 
flights. This means that, in scheduling an additional flight, a carrier will take 
into account the additional congestion costs imposed on the other flights it 
operates. The appropriate congestion toll then captures only the congestion 
imposed on other carriers, excluding the congestion the carrier imposes on 
itself.  
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An important implication of internalization is that asymmetric carriers should 
pay different tolls. A carrier with a large flight share at a congested airport, 
which internalizes most of the congestion from its operation of an extra flight, 
should pay a low toll, while a smaller carrier, which internalizes little 
congestion, should pay a high toll. Because a slot-sale regime, with its 
uniform price, cannot duplicate this inverse relationship between a carrier’s 
flight share and its charge per flight, the regime is inefficient, unable to 
generate the socially optimal flight pattern. By failing to account for 
differences in the internalization of congestion, the uniform slot price 
excessively penalizes large carriers and insufficiently penalizes small carriers 
for the congestion created (Brueckner 2008:2). 
As a result of this pattern, large carriers will operate too few and small carriers 
too many flights under a slot-sale regime, provided the number of slots sold is 
close to the socially optimal flight volume.  
In the models, large and small airlines are replaced by asymmetric carriers, 
then the slot-sale regime’s common price does not constitute an inefficient 
constraint, and the regime is efficient. The analysis shows that efficiency also 
obtains when carriers do not internalise congestion, Daniels (1995) and 
Daniels and Harback (2008) claim that this behaviour is realistic. They argue 
that non-internalization behaviour emerges in the presence of competitive-
fringe carriers, who offset through their own flight increases any large carriers 
to limit self-imposed congestion. 
In a slot trading regime, slots are distributed to carriers and then traded 
among them at a fixed price (also known as a “secondary market” for slots). 
The analysis shows that such a regime is efficient, overcoming the slot-sale 
regime’s limitations, provided that the optimal number of slots is distributed. 
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The main difference between the regimes is that carriers participating in a 
slot-trading understand that the total flight volume is fixed by the number of 
distributed slots, while slot-sale participants perceive no such constraint, 
expecting total flights (and airport congestion) to be affected by their slot 
purchases. The differing view of carriers under a slot-trading regime 
generates an efficient outcome (Brueckner 2008:4). 
According to Brueckner (2008:4) in an actual implementation of congestion 
tolls or a slot-sale regime, different behaviour could emerge. The 
implementation of tolls might rely on an iterative approach, where peak-period 
tolls are initially computed based on current traffic volumes and then adjusted 
downward as traffic shifts towards off-peak periods. The carriers, perceiving a 
connection between flight volumes and tolls, would then have an incentive to 
manipulate the system, acting on the basis of underestimated demands for 
airport usage with the goal of depressing the toll.  
Similarly, under a slot-sale regime, the airport authority might take a trial-and-
error approach in setting the slot price, encouraging the airlines to view the 
price as endogenous and thus subject to manipulation. The same incentive 
might arise under a slot-trading regime. If such manipulative behaviour 
occurs, then the results of the analysis are not strictly relevant, calling into 
question their usefulness as a guide for public policy. However, if the extent 
of manipulation is “small”, then the results may still have some practical value.  
Brueckner (2008:5) assumes that slots are allocated via a uniform-price, 
multi-unit auction, and no strategic bidding, with carriers assumed to make 
bids based on their true valuation of slots. The analysis shows that, without 
strategic behaviour, the auction generates the same efficient outcome as the 
slot-trading regime.  
45 
 
 
Under these circumstances, optimal congestion tolls differ across carriers, 
and since a slot-sale regime (with its uniform slot-price) cannot duplicate this 
pattern: the equilibrium it generates is inefficient. Flight volumes tend to be 
too low for large carriers and too high for small carriers. Under a slot-trading 
regime, the distribution of a fixed number of slots causes carriers to treat total 
flight volume (and thus congestion) as fixed, and this difference leads to an 
efficient outcome as long as the number of slots is optimally chosen. A slot 
auction is efficient for the same reason. 
A slot-trading regime, where slots are distributed to the carriers and then 
traded through a clearing house, is equivalent to an efficient regime of carrier-
specific congestion toll. Since such a toll regime is bound to be controversial 
given that the tolls it generates are inversely related to carrier size, the 
analysis generates a presumption in favour of the equivalent slot trading 
regime. The bilateral system should be replaced by a central clearing house, 
and a slot purchase should confer clear property rights, replacing the current 
arrangement in which slots are ultimately the property of the FAA.  
 Although the analysis shows that a slot auction can also achieve efficiency, 
free distribution of slots might be preferable given the airline industry’s 
opposition to new, cost-increasing charges. Slots could be allocated in 
proportion to current flight volumes, and trading would occur when carriers 
seek to adjust these volumes. Hoarding of unused slots, meant to deny 
airport access to a carrier’s competitors, could be prevented by “use-it-or-
lose-it” requirements, which are already in place. It might appear that new 
entrants (who hold no slots) are disadvantaged under this system, but their 
status is no different from that of an incumbent carrier seeking to increase its 
flight volume, which must purchase new slots to do so (Brueckner 2008:22). 
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The micro management approach adopted by the FAA of prevailing on the 
major carriers to cut their peak flight volumes and prohibiting smaller carriers 
from adding flights to fill the gap promises a quick solution to the congestion 
problem. It assumes, however, that demand is elastic. This is not the case at 
ORTIA as the majority of passengers in the morning and evening peaks are 
business. The demand from the business sector tends to be inelastic. 
In the US, the US Department of Justice endorsed slot auction as a 
mechanism for addressing airport congestion. This prompted the FAA to 
change its rules on landing fees by allowing the fees to vary by time of day. 
The FAA’s decision allowed slot-auction, slot-sale, slot-trade and congestion 
pricing to be considered as pricing options to address airport congestion. 
Brueckner (2008)’s analysis identifies equivalent slot trading regime as the 
preferred approach. He, however, does not adequately address the issues of 
initial slot allocation and how to deal with new entrants. His proposed method 
of initial slot allocation is equivalent to “grandfather rights”. Furthermore he 
does not address the contentious issue of slot ownership. He does suggest 
that a slot purchase should confer property rights.     
2.6.4 Collaborative Decision Making 
According to Auerbach and Koch (2007:40), operational airport capacity can 
be enhanced by the joint management of on time performance (OTP). The 
Association of European Airport (2006) reports reveal that since 2000, 
punctuality of intra European flights has improved from 74.5 to 80.7 percent 
while punctuality for intercontinental flights still remained at 70.8 percent. In 
2003, Euro-control reported that European air traffic delays caused by 
shortage in airport capacity and inefficient airport operations have exceeded 
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those caused by en-route air traffic management for the first time. See Figure 
2-7. 
 
Figure 2-7: Airport and En-route delays 2000-2004. Auerbach and Koch 
(2007:40)  
 Airport operators make inefficient use of existing infrastructure, allocate 
airport slots poorly and supply insufficient information about late stand and 
gate dispositions. Ground handling service providers exacerbate the situation 
by providing poor service levels and by making poor use of their resources. 
They also suffer from low turn-around predictability due to last minute 
changes. Air Traffic control (ATC) service providers have to manage air space 
and have to cope with traffic and frequency overload, as well as late incoming 
information that reduces pre-planning flexibility.  
On time operation is considered to be a key performance indicator in the 
airline industry and is an important service differentiator, particularly for high-
yield passengers. As a result, many carriers have set up projects to realize 
cost saving potentials and service improvements.  
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A precondition for a successful project is awareness that delay may result 
from many different but often interdependent reasons.  
Therefore, for an OTP improvement initiative to succeed, the project team 
needs to consist of representatives from airlines, airport, air traffic 
management and related parties (e.g. ground handling services providers). 
Collaboration decision making (CDM) is a means to cope with punctuality 
challenges at congested airports and could lead to an increase in operational 
capacity without significant investments in airport or air space infrastructure 
(Auerbach and Koch 2007:41). From an airline’s perspective, CDM should be 
considered as allowing carriers to participate in air traffic decision-making that 
affects them as shown in Figure 2-8. 
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Figure 2-8: CDM and its benefits for the involved parties. Auerbach and 
Koch (2007:42)  
In 2005, the introduction of CDM at Zurich airport led to improvements in OTP 
as indicated in Figure 2-9. Departure punctuality improved by three percent, 
passenger waiting time was reduced by 160 00 hours, and improved 
coordination of ground processes led to an increase of fifteen percent in 
landing capacity under bad weather conditions and an improvement of all 
landing ratios by three flights per hour. 
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Figure 2-9: Arrival and departure punctuality at Zurich Airport. Auerbach 
and Koch (2007:43)  
Figure 2-7 indicates that in Europe, aircraft delays caused by en-route delays 
have been exceeded by aircraft delays caused by lack of airport capacity. 
This could be primarily because of the increase in airport operations resulting 
from the increase in traffic at the various airports. Zurich airport responded by 
introducing CDM with the aim of improving OTP. CDM at Zurich airport 
improved departure punctuality, reduced passenger and aircraft delays and 
marginally improved the overall capacity of the airport. 
At ORTIA, before 2009, there was no mechanism in place for measuring and 
monitoring delays. The demand on airport infrastructure increased rapidly and 
major infrastructure investments aimed at increasing capacity were 
implemented. As mentioned in section 2.6.2, the IATA based slot allocation 
approach was the primary means of managing runway capacity. This 
approach has been identified in literature as a contributor to airport 
congestion. In 2009, ACSA introduced its own version of CDM which is based 
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on the Zurich model in the form of an Airport Management Center (AMC). 
Since its inception the AMC has significantly improved the OTP as indicated 
in Figure 2-10, Figure 2-11 and Figure 2-12 and has reduced passenger 
delays as indicated in Figure 2-13. In Figure 2-10, the fifteen minutes refers to 
the buffet time allocated for late arrival and departures. Late arrivals and 
departures within the fifteen minute buffer are not considered as late. With the 
introduction of the AMC, OTP improved from 75 to 83 percent of flights. From 
Figure 2-11 flights departing on their exact scheduled time improved from 36 
to 50 percent. From Figure 2-12 average aircraft delay decreased from fifteen 
minutes to five minutes. Figure 2-13, indicates that the average delay per 
passenger decreased from sixteen to nine minutes. The impact of the AMC 
on overall capacity has not been quantified however one can infer from these 
results that the will be some improvement. The full benefit of the AMC has not 
yet been realized, this is because not all airport stake holders responsible for 
operations are represented at the AMC. Participation in CDM via the AMC is 
voluntary and should be made a requirement for full benefits to be realized. 
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Figure 2-11: Zero minute on-time departure performance at ORTIA. 
ACSA (2011) 
 Figure 2-10: Fifteen minute on-time departure performance at ORTIA. 
ACSA (2011) 
53 
 
 
 
Figure 2-12: Difference between actual and scheduled times at ORTIA. 
ACSA (2011) 
 
Figure 2-13: Monthly delay per passenger at ORTIA. ACSA (2011)  
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2.6.5 Systems approach to congestion management 
Black and Larson (2006:1) propose strategies to overcome congestion in the 
broader infrastructure systems. The infrastructure systems they looked at 
include transport networks (rails, highways, airports and sea ports), 
telecommunication networks and utilities (electricity, water, gas, oil and 
sewerage). These infrastructure systems have predictable cyclic patterns of 
demand for their services, with demand peaks and demand valleys. The 
cycles have multiple frequency components: daily, weekly and seasonal. To 
meet peak demand, capacity needs to be expanded. At other times, the 
infrastructure supporting the service may sit idle. Therefore, these industries 
would benefit from some form of demand management. 
They propose the following options to deal with the congestion: 
 Capacity expansion; 
 Capacity upgrade; 
 Substitution; 
 Rationing (discriminatory or non discriminatory); 
 Loss or degradation of service; 
 Demand management congestion pricing. 
According to Black and Larson (2006:11-125), the most common means of 
alleviating congestion at airports is through the construction of new runways. 
Alternative means include improving the air traffic control system, and adding 
gates, taxiways or aircraft to the system. They argue that congestion pricing 
policies for the air traffic can be implemented at the consumer level, the flight 
level or both. Airlines have sophisticated, dynamic pricing schemes for 
managing consumer level demand and maximising capacity utilisation. 
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A similar system of congestion pricing for aircraft would enable the air 
transportation system to operate more efficiently. Peak demand in air 
transport has a time and location component. The hub and spoke system 
employed by major airlines leads to several congested hubs with coordinated 
flights to maximise connections and minimise consumer waiting times. In 
addition, there is a seasonal component to commercial air travel. Leisure 
travellers may be willing to adjust their flight schedules within a day or week, 
but it is unlikely that they are able to dramatically alter the seasonal pattern in 
their travel schedule. Business travellers have an inelastic demand and are 
unlikely to adjust their demand between days, and less willing to do so even 
within a day.     
Due to the lack of substitute available for long distance flights, consumers 
must accommodate to the available flight schedules. For shorter flights, it is 
possible for rail, buses or motor vehicles to be substituted for flying. The 
immediate post “9/11” decrease in air travel demand illustrates that there is a 
degree of elasticity which can make congestion pricing effective at smoothing 
demand peaks. After “9/11”, air travel virtually came to a stand-still because 
of air space restrictions; therefore the demand elasticity observed by Black 
and Larson was as a result of the unavailability of air travel as opposed to 
passenger willingness to use alternative modes. Table 2-4 illustrates the 
potential for congestion pricing to reduce infrastructure investment costs for 
various infrastructure systems. 
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Table 2-4: Potential for congestion pricing to reduce infrastructure 
investment costs. Black and Larson (2006:22) 
Black and Larson (2006) adopt a holistic view to addressing congestion in 
infrastructure systems. They use what is referred to as a “systems approach” 
to the infrastructure congestion problem. According to them, infrastructure 
systems have predictable cyclical patterns of demand for their services, with 
demand peaks and valleys. They notice that due to the cyclical nature of the 
demand for service, infrastructure systems supporting the service my sit idle 
for long periods of time. They argue that infrastructure systems would benefit 
from some form of demand management. 
Black and Larson raise two unique options to deal with the congestion namely 
rationing (discriminatory or non discriminatory) and loss or degradation of 
service. They, however, do not elaborate on how the rationing would be 
implemented. Whether rationing is implemented discriminatory or non 
discriminatory, its implementation is bound to experience serious objections 
from the airline industry. 
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Loss or degradation of service is equivalent to the United States model of slot 
allocation at airports outside of the HDR discussed in section 2.6.2 where 
slots are allocated on a first come first serve basis and no limit is placed on 
the amount of slots allocated. The rationale is that the market will eventually 
establish some form of “equilibrium”. The airlines will by themselves choose 
to discontinue flights in the peak as delays get longer. De Neufville and Odoni 
(2003) argue that this is expensive and inefficient for both the airport authority 
and the airlines to establish market “equilibrium”.  
Black and Larson (2006), argue that congestion pricing policies for air traffic 
can be implemented at the consumer level, the flight level or both. Airlines 
already have sophisticated, dynamic pricing schemes for managing consumer 
level demand and maximising capacity utilisation. A similar system of 
congestion pricing for aircraft would enable the air transportation system to 
operate more efficiently. 
What Black and Larson do not address is the issue of implementation. In 
section 5, Schank (1994) investigates the implementation of peak pricing at 
Boston Logan, LaGuardia and Heathrow Airports. He concludes that there 
are socio-economic, institutional and political barriers to the implementation of 
peak pricing. 
2.6.6 Optimum runway capacity utilisation     
According to Le et al (2008:1-6), most airports in the United States do not 
place any limitations on airline schedules. At some major airports, the current 
scheduling restrictions, which are mostly administrative measures, have not 
been sufficiently strict to avoid consistent delays and have raised debate 
about both the efficiency and the fairness of the allocation.  
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They argue that airport expansion and technology enhancement alone are 
not enough to cope with the competition-driven scheduling practices of the 
airline industry and that the policy legacy needs to change to be consistent 
with airport capacities. 
Their research studies how flight schedules might change if airlines had to 
restrict their schedules to be consistent with runway capacity. To obtain these 
schedules, they assume a different modelling approach. They model a profit-
seeking, single benevolent airline and develop an airline economic model to 
simulate its scheduling decisions. The airline is benevolent in the sense that it 
considers historic pricing at LaGuardia airport and the associated price-
elasticity and attempts to service this population while simultaneously 
remaining profitable. They explicitly incorporate the relationship between 
supply and demand through price elasticity, which they estimate by analysing 
the extensive data of publicly available databases.          
 Their case study demonstrates that: 
 At Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC) runway rates, the 
market can find profitable flight schedules that reduce substantially the 
average flight delay while accommodating the current passenger 
demand at prices consistent with the current competitive market; 
 The IMC rate provides a predictable on-time performance for the 
identified schedules in all weather conditions;  
 The reduction of flights through consolidation of low load-factor flights 
and through aircraft up-gauging alleviate much of the current traffic 
pressure on high demand airports.  
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Le et al (2008:1-6) adopt a different approach to addressing the runway 
congestion problem. They look at how airlines schedule flights and attempt to 
develop flight schedule to match the current runway capacity. Although their 
research demonstrates that it is possible to develop such a flight schedule, 
the practicality of implementing such a schedule is questionable. Firstly, there 
are a large number of airlines operating at major airports. Secondly, arrival 
and departure slots must be coordinated at all the airports that are connected 
by flights. This would require coordination at an international scale. 
Furthermore, their findings are based on the assumption that airlines will 
operate bigger aircraft in order to increase passenger throughput, given the 
limited number of slots. This is only achievable over a relatively long period of 
time as some airlines may have to acquire new aircraft or reassign existing 
aircraft.  
2.6.7 Airline and rail integration 
Givon and Banister (2006:386) consider the concept of airline and rail 
integration in addressing the airport capacity problem. Most of the transport 
literature only looks at mode alternatives in competition with each other rather 
than exploring the potential for cooperation. They examine the possibility by 
making the case for aircraft and high speed train (HST) substitution under 
conditions of intermodal integration. Airlines use railway services as additional 
spokes in their network of services from a hub airport to complement and 
substitute for existing aircraft services. Airlines benefit from the slots that are 
freed up and they can support mode substitution. Society gains from the 
social and economic benefits of better integrated transport services at a lower 
environmental cost. 
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Givon and Banister (2006:386) study the model of integration at Heathrow 
airport against the background of United Kingdom air transport policy and 
assessed the benefits and limitations of it. According to them, aircraft services 
have traditionally been seen in competition with the established railway 
services, but this has changed with the opening of the air market.  
Railways have started to recapture some of the traffic they lost to the airlines, 
as a result of the development of the HST. HST services can replace aircraft 
services on short haul air routes, and concerns about the environmental 
pollution from aircraft operations and the capacity shortage at major airports 
have increased the calls for mode substitution. 
The European Union (EU) has claimed that: 
“we can no longer think of maintaining air links to destinations for 
where there is a competitive high-speed rail alternative… network 
planning should therefore seek to take advantage of the ability of HST 
to replace air transport and encourage rail companies, airlines and 
airport managers not just to compete, but also to cooperate,” (CEC, 
2001:38). 
According to Givon and Banister (2006:386), where aircraft and HST 
substitution takes place it leads to competition between the operators, the 
airlines and the train operating companies (TOCs). The potential for benefits 
from mode substitution is then diminished as train services are added to the 
air services rather than replacing them. The competition between the modes 
has led the air transport industry to reject the idea of mode substitution, and it 
can even lead the airlines to increase their services.  
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However, when HST and conventional railway infrastructure is provided at 
airports, the air transport industry sees an opportunity in mode substitution, 
with the substitution of aircraft by HST, and the integration of railway services 
with flights. 
They argue that policy makers fail to recognise the distinction between the 
two forms of mode substitution as they normally only support mode 
substitution where competition between the modes is encouraged. In 
addition, when the role of the railways is considered in terms of the future of 
the air transport industry, it is limited to the access to airport issue, and the 
potential for airline and railway integration is overlooked. 
According to Givon and Banister (2006:389) the economic literature promotes 
intermodal competition, as this gives greater choice to the user and may 
assist in keeping prices down. In the case of aircraft and HST services, the 
potential benefits from cooperation and integration between the modes 
(operators) are greater than the benefits from competition. The socio-
economic arguments given in support of the construction of new runways in 
general equally apply to the construction of a railway station at the airport, 
provided that it allows direct, fast and high frequency service from the airport 
to many destinations and an easy transfer between the train and the aircraft. 
Furthermore, increasing an airport’s capacity through a railway station instead 
of a new runway secures these social-economic benefits at a lower 
environmental cost.  
Their main finding is that the railways have an important role to play in the 
future of air transport, and recommend that the definition of air transport be 
expanded to include the railways. 
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This is necessary to make policy makers consider the two modes as part of 
one transport network and to promote airline and railway integration and to 
ensure adequate planning of railway services to and from airports. 
Givon and Banister (2006:396) caution that, although airline and railway 
integration offers advantages, it is not a panacea to the environmental and 
congestion problems faced by the air transport industry, and it will not lead to 
meeting the growth in demand for air services. It will also not lead to 
balancing the economic, social and environmental costs and benefits of air 
transport if it is used only to meet new demand, by using the freed runway 
capacity for new air services. The balance would be achieved if the supply of 
air services is partly achieved through the use of the railways, and if new 
demand is not only met by new runways. Thus, a trade-off between social-
economic benefits and environmental and congestion costs will still be 
necessary, even after the development of airline and railway integration.     
Janić (2010) studies the potential savings of delays and related costs for 
airlines and their passengers that could be achieved by substitution of some 
comparable air passenger transport (APT) short- haul flights by high-speed 
rail (HSR) services at a large congested European airport. He develops a 
deterministic queuing model for quantifying the savings and he applies his 
model to a large congested European airport using the what-if scenario 
approach. 
According to Janić (2010:78), in Europe, airports are considered as 
multimodal transport nodes if they are included in the surface long-distance 
network. In the period between 1990 and 2006, APT demand in the European 
Union (EU) and HSR has grown at five and sixteen percent respectively as 
shown in Figure 2-14. 
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HSR and APT may interact in the areas of competition and complementarity. 
Both areas may result in substitution of services between the two modes. 
Such substitution, in addition to relieving congestion and aircraft-flight delays 
at airports at both ends of a HSR-APT market-route may improve internal 
efficiency of each mode and contribute to mitigating their overall burden on 
the environment. Figure 2-15 shows that with travel time between 1 and 3 
hours, HSR has taken over from APT a significant, from about 30 to 60 
percent. 
Figure 2-14: Development of ATP and HSR traffic in EU during the 
period 1990-2006. Association of European Airlines (2000-2006) 
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Figure 2-15: Market share of HSR competing with APT on journey time 
in selected European corridors-market. Air and rail competitions and 
complementarity (2000)    
APT has responded by cancelling short-haul flights due to lack of their 
profitability or due to the lack of the convenient slots at some (congested slot-
constrained) airports at the ends of particular market-corridors. Their latter 
reason implies not getting a slot at all or getting a slot at an inconvenient time 
when no substantive demand or long delays due to congestion might be 
expected. 
On the one hand, these delays are unacceptable due to propagating through 
the airline network and thus compromise efficiency and effectiveness of the 
daily schedule of affected aircraft. On the other, preventing access for these 
short-haul flights mitigates the overall congestion and thus saves delays and 
related costs for other aircraft-flights and air passengers that come after these 
substituted flights at congested airports. 
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According to Janić (2010:80), HSR and APT complement each other by 
offering integrated services in specific market-corridors. Passengers perceive 
complementarity if they are offered seamless services by a combination 
instead of a single transport mode. He identifies two types of complementary 
networks: 
 HSR may partially or completely replace APT “feeder” flights in 
collecting and distributing passengers between a hub airport included 
in an HSR network and spoke airports or cities. In such cases, the 
feeder HSR services connect to long-haul flights in accordance with a 
compatible timetable; 
 APT may connect the associated spoke to a given hub airport while 
HSR may exclusively provide the surface connection between the hub 
airports themselves. 
APT and HSR integration is expected to create the following effect: 
 Substitution of some short-haul flights by HSR services can relieve 
demand on existing airport airside capacity and consequently mitigate 
congestion, delays and related costs of the remaining aircraft-flights on 
one hand and enable utilization of the freed slots by larger aircraft on 
the other; 
 Extension of gravitational areas of specific airports as a result of their 
accessibility by high-speed surface transport; 
 Diminishing of the environmental impacts at airports of noise, pollution 
and land-use in both relative and absolute terms on one hand and 
increasing of social welfare by increased employment on the other. 
Janić (2010:83) applies his model to estimate the potential of substitution of 
some short-haul flights by HSR services at London Heathrow Airport. The 
results from the model application indicate that, in the Heathrow example, 
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modest substitution of short-haul flights (up to two percent) by HSR services 
could have a substantial daily savings potential of up to about twenty percent 
in the delays and seventeen percent in their costs.  
The concept of airline and rail integration could potentially be implemented at 
ORTIA to complement the APT to KSIA. The major impediment not discussed 
by the authors is the initial capital investment required in countries like SA 
that do not have a well developed and maintained rail infrastructure. When 
one compares the required capital investment and the time it would take to 
fully implement a new HST line, it could be argued that it would perhaps be 
better to construct a completely new airport to complement the existing one.   
2.7   Demand Management 
2.7.1 Broad overview  
De Neufville and Odoni (2003:461) define demand management as any set of 
administrative or economic measures and regulations aimed at constraining 
the demand for access to a busy airfield and at modifying temporarily the 
characteristics of such demand. According to them, the available approaches 
can be subdivided into three categories: 
 Purely administrative; 
 Purely economic and; 
 Hybrid (combination of the former two). 
The fundamental rationale behind the economic and hybrid categories is that 
they impose on airport users to consider the full costs of access, including the 
delay costs they impose on other airport users.  
According to them all purely economic approaches to demand management 
involving some measure of congestion pricing, are based on the principle that 
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to optimise use of a congested facility users should be forced to internalize 
fully the external costs imposed by their use of the facility.  
Hybrid demand management systems combine elements of administrative 
and economic approaches. Their common characteristic is the use of 
administrative procedures to specify the number of slots available at an 
airport. Hybrid systems rely on such economic devices as congestion pricing, 
slot markets and auction to arrive at the final allocation of slots (De Neufville 
and Odoni 2003:462). 
2.7.2 Evolution of demand management 
According to de Neufville and Odoni (2003:462), the relationship between 
demand and capacity and the air traffic congestion at major commercial 
airports have led to increased interest in airport demand management. Until 
the early 1980s, demand management was practiced at only a few airports 
worldwide.  Primarily because of its potential for negatively affecting 
competition, scholars considered it to be a method of last resort for reducing 
airport congestion and congestion costs.  
However, in modern times, the debate on demand management has shifted 
from whether it should be used at all to how it can be applied most effectively. 
The overall premise is as follows: capacity expansions should generally be 
the principal means for accommodating growth in airport demand, but it may 
require a long time or may even be entirely infeasible. In such circumstances, 
some form of demand management may be the only available alternative, at 
least in the short and medium terms, for keeping delays within reasonable 
bounds. 
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2.7.3 Justification for demand management application 
The motivation for demand management comes from a fundamental 
observation that when the demand approaches the capacity of a system, the 
relationship between delay and capacity or demand becomes nonlinear.  
A relatively small increase in capacity or a relatively small reduction of the 
demand rate results in a proportionally larger reduction in delay. Demand 
management aims at achieving those small reductions in demand or the shift 
in demand from peak to off peak periods that will bring about these large 
delay reduction benefits (De Neufville and Odoni 2003:465). 
Some scholars argue that demand management is unnecessary even at the 
busiest airports because delay will act by itself as an access-control 
mechanism. According to this argument, as delays at an airport grow, aircraft 
operators will deem the situation unacceptable and will choose not to use the 
airport. The costs associated with delay, as perceived by individual users, will 
become so high that demand will cease to grow and “equilibrium” will be 
reached.  However, this line of reasoning is fundamentally flawed because 
the equilibrium reached in this way will be inefficient economically, as delays 
to aircraft and passengers will be excessive and the mix of airport users may 
include a large percentage who have a low value of time and whose use of 
the airport cannot be justified on economic grounds (De Neufville and Odoni 
2003:465). 
Aviation experts have come to realize that the “do-nothing” alternative, 
allowing demand to grow unabated until the users themselves become 
discouraged by the high cost of delays, is wasteful and inefficient. This has 
motivated the extensive ongoing examination of the relative merits and 
effectiveness of the various demand management approaches. 
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Administrative approaches to demand management have been discussed 
extensively in section 2.6.2, therefore the following section focuses on 
economic and hybrid approaches to demand management. 
2.7.4 Economic Approaches to demand management 
Economic approaches to airport demand management utilize various 
methods of congestion pricing to exercise control over airport access. A 
system of charges based on congestion pricing principles takes into 
consideration the pattern of delay at an airport over time and attempts to 
reduce these delays to an economically efficient level. The access charges 
vary with time of day, as well as possibly by season and even by day of the 
week, with higher charges during peak demand periods and lower charges 
during off-peak periods (De Neufville and Odoni 2003:475). 
2.7.4.1  Congestion pricing theory 
Access to an airport is paid for through a landing charge/fee. The landing 
charge is proportional to the weight of the aircraft and is determined through 
the average-cost pricing method1. There are two aspects of this practice that 
are of interest.  Firstly, as the amount of traffic at a congested airport 
increase, the landing charges will decrease, this is so because the cost of the 
airfield is divided among users and aircraft weight. Thus with average cost 
                                            
 
1
 Briefly, average-cost pricing consists of three basic steps: (1) a target amount of revenue, 
X, to be collected from landing fees, is specified at the beginning of the airport’s financial year 
(typically X is equal  to the annual cost of the airfield, including a reasonable return on the 
airport’s investment); (2) a forecast is made of the total number of unit weight, Y, of all the 
aircraft that will utilize the airport during that year; and (3) the landing fee per unit of weight, 
Z, is set equal to the ratio X/Y.  
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pricing, access to the airport becomes cheaper as congestion worsens. 
Secondly, there is a tenuous relationship between the landing charge an 
aircraft pays and the true costs imposed by that aircraft’s operation.   
A landing charge based solely on the landing weight of the aircraft essentially 
charges aircraft according to their “ability to pay”, rather than in proportion to 
the costs they cause to others by operating at the airport (De Neufville and 
Odoni 2003:476). 
Yet all aircraft will occupy the runway and associated final approach path for 
roughly similar amounts of time and runway occupancy time is the main issue 
in the case of congested airport facilities. De Neufville and Odoni (2003) 
argue that this fundamental inconsistency between the price charged and the 
true cost of using congested airport facilities has been pointed out by 
economists and is recognized by airport and civil aviation experts and 
administrators.  
The theory of congestion pricing is well established in the literature of 
economics, therefore, only its main points are summarized in this report. 
According to De Neufville and Odoni (2003:477), every user who obtains 
access to the facility during periods when delays exist generates a congestion 
cost that consists of two components: 
 An “internal delay cost”’: the cost that this particular user will incur due 
to the delay that user suffers and; 
 An “external delay cost”: the cost of the additional delay to all other 
prospective facility users which is caused by this particular user. 
When an aircraft pays only the traditional weight-based landing charge to 
operate at an airport, regardless of how congested that airport might be, the 
only cost in addition to the landing fee which the aircraft’s operator will 
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perceive is the internal delay cost, the cost due to the delay the airplane in 
question suffers. Those airport users with the highest tolerance for internal 
delay costs, those with a low cost of delay time, will be the ones who will 
continue using an airport as congestion and delays increase. 
By contrast, high-value-of-time operations, such as airline flights with large 
numbers of passengers, short connection and turnaround times on the 
ground, are the ones that will be the most sensitive to worsening congestion.  
The fundamental principle that the theory of congestion pricing applies in 
such cases is that, to achieve an economically efficient use of the facility, one 
must impose a congestion toll on each user which is equal to the external 
cost associated with the user’s access to the facility. Economists refer to this 
as forcing users to “internalize external costs”. The underlying rationale is 
those who can pay the congestion toll can compensate “society” for the 
external costs they impose, must be deriving an economic value from the use 
of the facility that exceeds the external costs. 
In other words, their use of the facility increases total economic welfare. 
Conversely, a user who is not able to pay the congestion toll must be deriving 
a net economic benefit from the use of the facility that is less than the cost 
imposed on others. Otherwise, the user would be willing to pay the toll. 
Prospective users in this category are denied access to the facility through 
the device of the congestion toll, because such access reduces total 
economic welfare (De Neufville and Odoni, 2003:478). 
 Figure 2-16 illustrates the situation. Curve D is the demand “curve” at the 
runway system of an airport facing capacity constraints. Curve I shows how 
the expected cost of delay suffered by each individual aircraft movement 
(“internal delay cost”) increases as a function of demand. Curve T shows the 
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sum of the internal delay costs and the external delay cost generated by each 
additional aircraft movement at every level of demand. 
 
Figure 2-16: The effect of charging for external delay costs. De Neufville 
and Odoni (2003:479) 
The difference between curve T and curve I at each level of demand is equal 
to the external delay cost generated by an additional or “marginal” aircraft 
movement at that level of demand. When there is no congestion toll, when 
aircraft do not pay for any part of the delays they cause to other aircraft, the 
equilibrium point is at 1, where the demand curve D intersects the internal 
delay cost curve I. the equilibrium level of demand is equal to A, the 
projection of point 1 on the demand axis.  
When a congestion toll is imposed with a value equal to the external delay 
cost caused by the marginal runway system user, the new equilibrium is at 2, 
the point where the demand function D intersects the total cost curve T. Thus, 
the new equilibrium level of demand is equal to B. The demand has been 
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reduced by an amount equal to (A-B) because of the congestion toll. In turn, 
the congestion toll is equal to the external cost corresponding to a demand 
equal to B, to (x-y) in Figure 2-19. The total amount collected from congestion 
tolls is B(x-y), the area corresponding to the rectangle yx2B’ in Figure 2-16. 
2.7.4.2  Practicalities of Congestion Pricing 
The practicalities of implementing congestion pricing and the types of 
congestion pricing that were implemented in Europe and in the United States 
are examined looking specifically at why they were unsuccessful and are 
discussed in chapter 5 below. This section provides a broad overview of the 
practicalities of congestion pricing.  
The application of the theory of congestion pricing to airports is a challenging   
undertaking. At a technical level, it is difficult to estimate accurately the 
marginal external cost for any given level of demand. It is more difficult to 
predict the exact effect of any proposed system of congestion tolls on 
demand. De Neufville and Odoni (2003:480) attribute this difficulty to limited 
existing information about the elasticity of airport demand with respect to the 
landing fee (Cao and Kanafani 2000). Consequently, it is also difficult to 
determine the size of the landing fees that will lead to a stable situation that 
will not drive away too many or few users (Odoni 2001). 
The principal practical problem is more often a political one. The impact of 
congestion pricing is most severe on general aviation and on regional airlines. 
These two classes of users are the ones that can least afford to compensate 
others for external cost and oppose congestion pricing as being 
discriminatory against them.  
Smaller and remote communities, which depend on regional airlines for 
access to major airports and to the national and international aviation 
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systems, typically join in opposition. The major airlines often find themselves 
in an ambivalent position in this respect. In principle, these carriers stand to 
benefit the most from congestion pricing. When the traffic mix includes flight 
operations by general aviation, regional airlines, and the major carriers, the 
application of congestion pricing  reduces significantly delays to major 
carriers, by “driving away” from the peak traffic hours many general aviation 
and regional airline operations. 
As a result, major carrier operations face reduced costs, even after paying the 
higher landing fees. Yet major airlines, especially in the United States, have 
assumed a stance on congestion pricing that ranges from guarded to 
adversarial. There are several reasons for this stance. Many major carriers 
have alliances with regional and commuter airlines or even own such airlines 
as subsidiaries and are reluctant to support measures that are perceived as 
detrimental to them. Major carriers at busy airports also benefit from “feeder” 
traffic carriers by smaller aircraft to and from smaller communities. Such 
flights may be affected or inconvenienced by congestion pricing (De Neufville 
and Odoni 2003:480). 
According to De Neufville and Odoni (2003:481), the consequences of 
practical and political considerations, are that congestion pricing mechanisms 
that have been proposed or have been implemented are far less 
sophisticated than the theory suggests.  
They also generally impose or propose congestion tolls that are much lower 
than the true marginal external cost at congested airports suggest. Their 
congestion pricing schemes involve one of the following approaches: 
 A surcharge is applies to the weight-based landing fee paid by aircraft 
operating during the airport’s peak period(s); 
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 A flat fee, entirely or partly independent of the aircraft’s weight, is 
imposed on all aircraft operating during the peak period; 
 A multiplier is applied to the weight-based landing fee charged to 
aircraft operating during the peak period and; 
 A minimum landing fee is specified for aircraft operating during peak 
hours, to be applied only to aircraft that would otherwise have paid less 
than that amount. 
2.7.5 Hybrid approaches to demand management 
The starting point for all hybrid systems is the determination by some 
administrative authority of the number of slots to be made available at an 
airport.  However, instead of, or in addition to schedule coordinators, hybrid 
systems rely on such economic devices as congestion pricing, slot markets 
and slot auctions to arrive at the final allocation of slots among potential 
airport users (De Neufville and Odoni 2003:486).   
These three economic devices will be reviewed in the following section. 
2.7.5.1  Slots plus congestion pricing 
According to de Neufville and Odoni (2003:487) the application of this method 
involves the following steps: 
 “Declare” the airport capacity by specifying the number of slots 
available in each time period; 
 Develop and announce a schedule of landing fees and possibly other 
airport charges that vary by time of day and/or day of week and/or 
season; 
 Invite requests for slots from prospective users; and 
76 
 
 
 Use a schedule coordinator or other administrative mechanism to 
allocate slots, whenever the number of requests for a time period 
exceeds the number of available slots. 
They point out that the main difference between this and the purely 
administrative schedule coordination approach is that prospective airport 
users must now also consider the cost of access to the airport at different 
times when preparing their requests for slots.  The higher cost of access 
during peak periods may dissuade some prospective users from requesting 
slots these times.  
2.7.5.2 Buying and selling slots 
This method treats airport slots as a commodity that can be bought and sold. 
Once the number of slots available has been specified and the slots have 
somehow been allocated to prospective users, they become the property of 
their current holders, who may continue utilizing them for the operation of 
their own flights, lease them to another user, or sell them just like any other 
asset (De Neufville and Odoni 2003:489).  
An important part of this hybrid system is a clear explanation of the extent 
and duration of the rights inherent in a slot. The buy-and-sell approach, as 
well as the slot auction, enjoys an advantage over congestion pricing in at 
least one respect. Whereas congestion pricing has difficulty in determining, a 
priori, equilibrium congestion fees, buy-and-sell and slot auctions permit these 
prices to be determined directly by the market. 
2.7.5.3  Slot auction 
This method uses auctions to allocate slots. The following section gives a 
summary of the main steps involved: 
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 Provide a clear explanation of the extent and duration of the rights 
inherent in a slot; 
 The capacity of the subject airport, the number of slots available in 
each time period is specified. Let the capacity per time period be equal 
to C slots; 
 Airlines and other prospective airport users submit sealed bids for the 
slots they wish to obtain. A bidder can request more than one slot in 
any time period and can offer a different amount for the different slots; 
 After all the bids are received, the slots in each time period are 
awarded to the C highest bidders. If there are fewer than C bids for a 
particular time period, then all slots requested for that time period are 
accepted; 
 The price that a user actually pays for an awarded slot is set equal to 
the lowest successful bid in each time period. The rationale is that two 
successful bidders should not end up paying different amounts for 
slots that fall within the same time period. 
According to De Neufville and Odoni (2003), there is no precedent that exists 
for the allocation of airport slots through auction. There is complexity with the 
slot auctions in the airport context that stems from the strong 
interdependence of slots, both at the local level and across airports. Because 
of these strong interdependencies, the true value of the slots acquired will not 
be clear to an airline until all the slots are allocated. 
At that point, the airline will probably wish to dispose of some of the slots it 
has been awarded, revise the price it has offered to pay for others, and 
possibly acquire some additional slots. 
De Neufville and Odoni (2003:492) argue that, to make such post-auction 
adjustments possible, a follow-up slot market is needed. This follow-up 
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market is, in fact, an indispensable part of any demand management system 
based on auctions. Thus, a more viable hybrid system may be one in which 
the slots at an airport are auctioned off to the highest bidder by the airport 
operator and/or by a civil aviation organization and they become commodities 
that can be bought and sold.  
2.7.6 Quantitative impact of demand management 
According to Fan and Odoni (2001:2), various approaches to demand 
management have been suggested in the research literature, but few studies 
have provided quantitative evidence on two important questions: 
 The magnitude of the impact that demand management may have; 
 The extent to which the current weight-based landing fee systems 
under-price airside access to busy airports. 
Fan and Odoni (2001), address in quantitative terms these issues, using tools 
drawn from queuing theory. They discuss the question of the relative impacts 
of reductions in the total demand at an airport compared with a shifting in the 
distribution of demand by time of day. They then demonstrate how at 
congested airports, the current system of assessing weight-based landing 
fees contributes to congestion by greatly under-pricing access to a busy 
airport runway.  
Their analysis suggests that, in the short-run, well designed demand 
management schemes can be more effective than any other types of 
alternatives, in relieving congestion. They further propose a framework for 
assessing demand management alternatives and developing future policies.  
Figure 2-17 shows the combined take-off and landing profiles by hour-of-day 
on a typical weekday at LGA in November, 2000 and in August, 2001. 
Between these two months, the total number of scheduled airline operations 
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decreased by about ten percent (from 1348 per day to 1205 per day) primarily 
as a result of the lottery results that became effective on January 31, 2001.  
 
Figure 2-17: Flight operations at LGA before and after slot lottery. Fan 
and Odoni (2001:6) 
Figure 2-18 compares average delay per flight, using the flight schedule in 
November, 2000 and August 2001. Each flight scheduled to depart or arrive 
at the evening peak period between 8pm and 10pm in November can expect 
to be delayed for one hour and twenty minutes, even if the VFR capacity is 
maintained throughout the day (highest numbers of runway movements are 
achieved under VFR). By contrast, flights scheduled to operate during the 
same period in August are delayed for an average of twenty minutes per 
flight. This represents an 80 percent reduction in delays during peak evening 
hours.  
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Figure 2-18: Average flight delays at LGA before and after slot lottery. 
Fan and Odoni (2001:6) 
Figure 2-19 shows the total delay in aircraft-hours during the day, suffered by 
operations scheduled in each hour. Similar to average delays, the total delay 
during evening peak hours rose beyond 140 aircraft-hours in November, 
compared with about 25 aircraft-hours in August for the same time period. 
According to Fan and Odoni (2001:3), the area under the August aircraft 
delays in Figure 2-19, representing the total delays for the entire day, totaled 
210 aircraft-hours, compared with 1160 aircraft hours for the November 
schedule. 
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Figure 2-19: Total flight delays at LGA before and after lottery. Fan and 
Odoni (2001:6) 
It is important for the airport to accurately determine its true capacity in 
handling aircraft operations. For a congested airport with demand for runway 
capacity close to or above its supply, the amount of delay is sensitive to the 
precise capacity number used. Figure 2-20 and Figure 2-21 show how the 
average and total delays in August, 2001 at LGA vary, if the capacity is at five 
operations per hour above and below the 75 operations per hour capacity 
used in the analysis. Reducing the 75 operations-per-hour capacity by five 
per hour increases the total delays between 6pm and 9pm from 73 aircraft-
hours to almost 200; increasing the capacity by five per hour halves the total 
delays to about 30 aircraft-hours (Fan and Odoni 2001:3). 
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Figure 2-20: Average flight delays at LGA under different capacities. Fan 
and Odoni (2001:7) 
 
Figure 2-21: Total flight delays at LGA under different capacities. Fan 
and Odoni (2001:7) 
83 
 
 
Flight delays can be reduced by leveling demand peaks, after the overall 
demand has been reduced to the level experienced in August 2001. Figure 
2-22 shows what the flight operations profile at LGA would look like in the 
case in which demand is evenly distributed throughout the period between 
seven in the morning and ten in the evening (72 and 73 operations/hour 
during this period).  
 
Figure 2-22: Leveling the hourly distribution of flight at LGA from 
August schedule. Fan and Odoni (2001:8) 
As shown in Figure 2-23 and Figure 2-24, the average and total delays 
resulting from the de-peaking of flights are reduced by a further 40 percent 
during peak evening hours and 20 percent during the morning peak hours. 
Compared with the actual August schedules, this reduced the total delays on 
the typical weekday from 211 aircraft-hours to 168 aircraft-hours, representing 
a 20 percent reduction.  
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Figure 2-23: Average flight delays for leveled distribution of flight from 
August Schedule. Fan and Odoni (2001:9) 
 
Figure 2-24: Total flight delays for leveled distribution of flight from 
August flight schedule. Fan and Odoni (2001:9) 
To arrive at an order-of-magnitude estimate of the marginal cost of 
congestion, an average per-hour flight operating cost is used. From published 
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airline schedules, an average fleet size at LGA is 102 in seating capacity and 
52 000kg in maximum take-off weight, corresponding roughly to a Boeing 737 
aircraft. Using an estimate of $1600/hour operating cost for an aircraft of this 
size, the marginal delay costs is computed from Figure 2-18. The resulting 
marginal delay cost curve for the August 2001 schedule shown in Figure 2-25 
can then be compared with the airport charge for each flight operation. As 
shown in Figure 2-25, from 8am to 8pm, the marginal delay cost caused by 
an extra flight operation is ten to twenty times as large as the average airport 
charge (landing fee levied 2001). Runway access at LGA is under-priced for 
most of the day and this, in part, contributes to the observed flight delays. 
 
Figure 2-25: Comparison between marginal delay costs and actual 
charges at LGA. Fan and Odoni (2001:10) 
Figure 2-29 illustrates the notional amount of flight delay reductions that may 
be achieved through a range of measures at airports with different demand-
to-capacity ratios. On the far right is the case where the demand for airport 
runway access is close to or above the maximum (sustainable VFR) capacity 
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all day. For airports in this category, a significant fraction of delay can be 
eliminated by reducing the total demand for the runway access. 
A mere leveling of the demand at such airports without reducing total demand 
to a level at or below the sustainable capacity will not be particularly effective. 
Reducing total demand requires relatively strong demand management 
actions, such as the imposition of a flat surcharge on landing fees for the 
greatest part of the typical day (Fan and Odoni 2001:4). 
 
Figure 2-26: Notional illustration of delay reduction for different airports. 
Fan and Odoni (2001:10) 
At airports where the demand is close to, or above, maximum capacity for 
only some periods of the day, a mere leveling of peak-period demand will 
lead to a sizable reduction in delays. Policy actions, such as mild forms of 
demand management, encouraging the shift of peak-period demand to non-
peak periods; without significantly reducing the total demand; may be 
sufficient. At airports with low demand-to-capacity ratios throughout the day 
demand management measures are not appropriate.  
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The optimal use of a congested facility is achieved only if each user pays for 
the marginal (“internalized”) costs they impose on all other users. For airports 
where there is a large number of high-volume users (or low industry 
concentration) operating non-homogeneous, point-point services, the extent 
of such internalization is limited. Economic demand management measures 
can be very effective in moving towards a more efficient operating point in 
such cases. By contrast, at airports dominated by only one or two high-
volume users (airlines with hubs there) operating connecting services, the 
high-volume users already internalize a substantial portion of the marginal 
costs. Economic demand management measures may therefore not be 
effective in these environments (Fan and Odoni 2001:5).  
This section discusses the various demand management approaches and 
highlights the challenges associated with the practicalities of implementing 
them. It demonstrates quantitatively the possible gains that could be achieved 
by the application of demand management. According to the scholars, none 
of the approaches described above fully satisfies all the requirements for an 
ideal demand management system. However, for a specific set of 
circumstances, certain approaches are superior and more suitable than 
others. For policy-setting purposes, the traditional weight-based landing fees 
do not take into consideration the costs associated with airport congestion. In 
fact, the weight-based fees contribute to congestion, by lowering the cost of 
airport access as demand grows and by encouraging users with low direct 
operating costs and low value of time to use busy airports. 
Demand management is not by any means intended to replace future airport 
developments.  It primary role is to regulate demand for service on a system. 
It achieves this by through efficient utilization of existing facilities, limiting the 
growth in peak demand and by channeling some peak demand to off peak 
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periods. Economic theory suggests that channeling demand to off peak 
periods is nearly impossible in practice as demand for air travel specifically 
from the business sector is highly in-elastic.  
De Neufville and Odoni (2003) contradict these findings by pointing out the 
changes in the travel patterns in the US following the events of 9 September 
2001. This demonstrates that price on its own will not significantly alter travel 
patterns to achieve significant changes in travel patterns. 
The argument by some scholars that demand management is unnecessary 
because delay will by itself act as an access-control mechanism might be 
justified. De Neufville and Odoni (2003) argue that the equilibrium reached 
this way will be inefficient economically. This might be the case in the short 
term, depending on how much delay cost the individual airlines are willing to 
incur. This will further eliminate the need for the airport authorities to quantify 
runway capacity and to administratively manage slot allocation as these will 
be done by the market. From an ACSA point of view, the responsibility to 
determine airport capacity could shift from ACSA to the airlines or ideally it 
could be a collective amongst all airport stakeholders. 
Theory on congestion pricing expresses a qualitative view of runway 
congestion pricing: it does not address the fundamental issue of what is the 
actual congestion charge should be set at. De Neufville and Odoni (2003) 
attribute the difficulty of quantifying marginal cost for a given demand to the 
lack of sufficient information about the elasticity of airport with respect to 
landing charges. 
The market based approach (“do nothing”) option will also eliminate most of 
the practicalities of congestion pricing. Hybrid Demand Management, 
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although it addresses some of the weakness inherent in the purely economic 
approach, does not specify how to deal with existing slot holders.  
Fan and Odoni (2001) studied quantitatively the impact of the various 
demand management approaches. Their findings are consistent with the 
literature on demand management. They were able to demonstrate 
quantitatively the reductions in aircraft delays achieved at LGA by the 
introduction of a lottery system. The study, however, focused on the 
outcomes of a lottery system applied at one airport. Whether similar results 
will be achieved for other demand management approaches has not been 
tested. 
From their study one can infer that, given the current levels of traffic at 
ORTIA, demand management measures are not appropriate at present as 
the demand-to-capacity ratio throughout the day is relatively low. However, 
the traffic levels at ORTIA are expected to grow in the next five to ten years to 
a level where maximum capacity for certain periods of the day will be 
exceeded. De Neufville and Odoni (2003) recommend levelling of the peak-
demand through policies such as “mild” forms of demand management.        
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3 TRAFFIC OVERVIEW 
3.1 Introduction 
This section outlines the global view and trends of air traffic growth. It is 
intended to highlight the fact that global air traffic in general and ORTIA in 
particular is expected to grow, putting further strain on existing airport 
infrastructure. Airports Council International (ACI) conducted a survey that 
covered 230 airports from large to small covering all aviation significant 
regions in the world. In the survey, participants were asked to indicate 
whether or not their traffic forecasts were constrained by airport capacity 
limits. The results indicate that about 60 percent of the respondents produced 
an unconstrained forecast as indicated in Figure 3-1. The unconstrained 
forecast could be attributed to the considerable investments in infrastructure 
that airport authorities are planning in the medium to long term. 
 
Figure 3-1: Share of constrained vs. unconstrained forecasts by world 
region. ACI (2007:11) 
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For the airports facing constraints the survey attempts to determine their 
source. 
Noise constraints are significant in Europe and in North America, while 
terminal capacity is an important issue for North American airports. For 
airports in the rest of the world, the apron is often the most important as 
indicated in Figure 3-2. Although runways are not singled out as major 
capacity constraints in the survey, it is apparent from the literature review that 
they are a major obstacle to airport growth.   
 
Figure 3-2: Sources of constraints by world regions. ACI (2007:11) 
The survey also covers the status of the airport regarding the granting of 
slots. In general, larger airports tend to be fully coordinated (69 percent) and 
a substantial proportion of small airports are non-coordinated (37 percent) as 
indicated in Figure 3-3. (ACI 2007: 11-23).ORTIA is classified as fully 
coordinated.  
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Figure 3-3: Airport status in terms of coordination of schedules. ACI 
(2007:23) 
3.2 Passenger Forecast 
In 2006, the twenty year global passenger growth rate was forecast to 
average four percent. Air transportation growth is predicted to be fuelled by a 
combination of economic growth, liberalizing markets and increased 
competition. Africa lags behind the rest of the world in terms of passenger 
numbers as indicated in Figure 3-4 and Table 3-1 to Table 3-3. 
 Africa is however expected to experience higher growth rates compared to 
the US and Europe because its aviation market is relatively “immature” 
compared to these regions. Although Africa’s economic growth is expected to 
be higher than the economic growth in these regions, Africa’s overall aviation 
market is expected to contribute less than 10 percent of the global market. 
One of the main reasons is that the African aviation market has not yet been 
fully liberalized.   
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Figure 3-4: 2005-2025 passenger forecast vs. passenger volume. ACI 
(2007:12) 
 
Table 3-1: Total passenger volume in (million). ACI (2007:14) 
 
Table 3-2: Domestic passenger volumes in (millions). ACI (2007:15) 
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Table 3-3: International passenger volumes by region (million). ACI 
(2007:16) 
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3.3 Aircraft movement forecast 
To meet rising passenger and freight demand, aircraft movements are 
expected to grow. Movements will nearly double, requiring not only new 
airport infrastructure but also investment in en-route and terminal air-traffic 
control systems. Figure 3-5 indicates the expected growth rate in aircraft 
movements internationally. 
 
Figure 3-5: Projected annual growth rates of world aircraft movements. 
ACI (2007:21)  
In the first quarter of 2011, ACSA commissioned ACI to undertake a review of 
the busy day traffic profiles at ORTIA, taking into account the most recent 
trends in air traffic developments in South Africa. From Figure 3-6, ORTIA has 
two distinctive aircraft movement peaks in the morning between 7:00 and 
11:00 and in the afternoon between 14:00 and 17:00.  
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Figure 3-6: Busy day hourly distribution of aircraft movements. ACI 
(2011:28) 
The declared capacity of the existing runway at ORTIA is roughly 58 
movements per hour as indicated in Figure 3-6 by the orange dashed line. 
The declared capacity is expected to be exceeded by 2017. Aircraft arriving 
or departing between 9:00 and 11:00 in the morning and 15:00 and 17:00 in 
the afternoon from year 2017 can expect to encounter delays. By 2022, the 
expected delays will be more severe and will occur almost throughout the day 
between 8:00 in the morning and 18:00 in the evening. ACSA plans to invest 
in excess of R 3 billion on a new runway with it associated taxiways by 2017 
to alleviate the expected congestion. The objective of this research report is 
to investigate alternative methods of alleviating the expected congestion with 
the aim of deferring the planned capital investment or possibly reducing the 
required scope.    
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3.4 Aircraft size forecast  
Orders for the largest aircraft, the Airbus A380 and the Boeing B787, could  
change the configuration of the global fleet and increase average passengers 
per movement. This coupled with higher load factors means the forecast 
anticipates an increase in passengers per movement. Three factors help 
explain this trend: the “low cost carrier” model development centered around 
single aisle aircraft (one class configuration with about 150 seats); the fact 
that “low cost carriers” operate at a higher load factor than their counterparts; 
and finally a more rapid development of international operations compared to 
domestic operations. (ACI 2007:11-23). ORTIA is much further from 
international markets compared to its global counterparts. Furthermore, SA 
cities are on average much futher apart, therefore, “low cost carriers” 
operating from ORTIA are focusing more on domestic and regional 
operations.  
From Figure 3-7, in 2005 Africa had an average of 73 passengers per aircraft 
movement. This figure is projected to grow to 114 passengers per movement. 
ORTIA is currently performing better than the current average for Africa at 
roughly 97 passenger per movement (ACSA 2011).  
This could be attributed amongst other thing to ”low cost carrier” activities and 
the introduction of the A380. 
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Figure 3-7: Average number of passengers per flight by region-total 
passenger operations. ACI (2007:22)  
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4  POLICY OPTIONS TO SLOT ALLOCATION  
4.1 Background  
This section highlights previous research work that has been conducted with 
regard to the compatibility of alternative slot allocation strategies in different 
airport settings. The literature review has identified slot allocation as one of 
the major contributors to alleviating runway congestion and has proposed a 
number of strategies for slot allocation. According to Madas and Zografos 
(2006:209-211), a number of distinct airport slot allocation strategies are 
identified as: 
 Status quo with recycling and centralised trading of the pool 
(“enhanced status quo-strat.1”); 
 Grandfather rights with recycling, auctioning of the pool, and 
secondary trading (“gradual-strat.2”); 
 Grandfather rights with full trading of all slots (“controlled trading-
strat.3”); 
 Congestion based pricing strategy (“congestion pricing-strat.4”); 
 Removal of grandfather rights accompanied by decentralised auction 
and secondary trading (“Big Bang with auctions and secondary 
trading-strat.5”). 
The above strategies introduce varying application of market-driven allocation 
instruments in the following three aspects: 
 Context (decentralized auctions, centralised trading, full trading, 
secondary trading, pricing); 
 Scope (primary versus secondary); 
 Extent (centralized trading, controlled trading, full trading). 
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Table 4-1 sketches the identified airport slot allocation strategies along with 
their key features, rules and components, the “Enhanced Status Quo” 
strategy (Strat.1) involves minimum departure from the existing system on the 
grounds that it fully maintains the overriding principle of historic slot holdings 
based on “grandfather” rights. It retains the rationale of administrative 
coordination of slot allocation in conjunction with primary slot trading 
(coordinated trading). 
The “Gradual” strategy (Strat.2) also involves a conservative approach albeit 
with a more clear orientation to market mechanism and a slightly more drastic 
revision of the status quo with regards to secondary allocation. In principle, it 
also retains the grandfather rights in the primary allocation process. However, 
it attempts an application of market-driven mechanisms (auctions, monetary 
trading). Apart from “grandfather” rights, all remaining slots are auctioned at 
the airport level with monetary trading between airlines also being allowed on 
a secondary level. 
The “Controlled Trading” strategy (Strat.3) combines conservative and 
innovative elements. It retains the principle of “grandfather” rights with minor 
modifications and adaptations, but simultaneously allows full (primary and 
secondary) monetary trading based on bilateral negotiations either between 
the airport and airlines (primary trading) or between airlines (secondary 
trading).  
The “Congestion Pricing” Strategy (Strat.4) represents the most direct pricing 
method for addressing the real cause of mismatch between capacity and 
demand. Under the congestion pricing strategy, “grandfather” rights are 
abandoned and a congestion-based scheme is set by an administrative 
authority in the form of a three-part tariff including: 
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 The traditional weight based fees and passenger surcharges;  
 A flat reservation fee applied per movement in the form of membership 
dues or “no-show” penalties; 
 A congestion based fee with fees varying with congestion throughout 
the day. 
 The “Big Bang” strategy (Strat.5) represents the opposite extreme to the 
“Enhanced Status Quo” and the “Gradual” strategy, in which ”grandfather” 
rights are abandoned with the entire slot pool being allocated by means of 
market- based instruments (decentralized auctions accompanied by 
secondary trading). 
 
Table 4-1: Alternative slot allocation strategies. Madas and Zografos 
(2006:209) 
4.1.1 Airport classification strategies 
Madas and Zografos (2006:212-215), develop an airport classification 
scheme in order to identify the various airport environments within which the 
various strategies could be evaluated.  
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According to them, different airport environments may exhibit different 
congestion patterns, delays and traffic characteristics, while they have 
different objectives and constraints and should comply with different policy 
priorities. Their clustering variables include the following: 
 Declared capacity; 
 Traffic volume (aircraft and passenger movements); 
 Congestion levels; 
 Measures of effectiveness of slot allocation and utilization (misused 
slots, unsatisfied demand, slot mobility);  
 “Grandfathered” over total number of slots.  
Table 4-2 details the cluster analysis properties used to develop the airport 
typology. 
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Table 4-2: Cluster analysis properties and methodological decisions. 
Madas and Zografos (2006:212)  
 The following airport clusters emerged according to the framework above: 
Cluster 4 “small national airports”. The airports included in this cluster are 
mainly small, satellite or regional airports acting as the spokes of their 
national airport network.  
Cluster 3 “Large National Spoke and Small National Hubs”. This cluster 
contains small and medium-sized airports acting mostly as large spokes of 
the national airport network (as compared to cluster 4) or small hubs 
channelling traffic from the national spokes to international hubs and vice 
versa.  
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Cluster 2 “Large International Hubs”. This cluster contains major, metropolitan 
airports of the European airport network acting mostly as large international 
hubs with focus on Intra-European routes and with growing potential to 
become one of the major European hubs included in Cluster 1. The airports 
included in Cluster 2 are primary and secondary large hubs of some major 
European airlines, which use these airports as servers of traffic both between 
international destinations, as well as between domestic and international 
destinations.  
Cluster 1 “Super Hubs”. This cluster represents the largest, busiest and most 
congested European airports with a worldwide presence and a strategic role 
in the European airport network.  
From Table 4-2, four clusters emerged from the sample of airports highlighted 
in Table 4-3. 
 
Table 4-3: Related airport clusters. Madas and Zografos (2006:213)  
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4.1.2 Policy compatibility assessment 
According to Madas and Zografos (2006:216-217) one of the primary policy 
concerns in implementing a slot allocation strategy is the potential 
compatibility of alternative strategies (policy compatibility analysis) with 
different airport settings (airport clusters). They apply an evaluation 
framework which provides guidance for the selection of the most compatible 
strategy on the basis of the following: 
 Multiple policy criteria and priorities; 
 Various groups of stakeholders (policy makers, airlines, airport 
operators, academic/research experts); 
 Different airport clusters. 
The model involves the development of n hierarchies where n signifies the 
number of resulting airport clusters consisting of the evaluation goal, the 
relevant policy criteria and indicators, as well as the evaluation alternatives 
(airport slot allocation strategies) for each airport cluster as depicted in Figure 
4-1.   
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Figure 4-1: Hierarchical decomposition of the policy compatibility 
assessment problem. Madas and Zografos (2006:216) 
The policy criteria and indicators involved in the selection of the most 
compatible strategy fall into one of the following broad categories: 
 Efficiency criterion; 
 Cost criterion; 
 Implementation criterion; 
 Acceptability criterion. 
The efficiency criterion addresses the capability of a strategy to deal with the 
scarcity of slots and produce a rationalised slot allocation outcome. 
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The cost criterion assesses the cost aspects associated with the 
implementation of a certain strategy. The implementation criterion examines 
the ease and pace of implementation, while the acceptability criterion 
assesses the ease of acceptance and adoption potential of a certain strategy. 
The identified policy criteria and their associated indicators are defined in 
Table 4-4.  
 
Table 4-4: Policy compatibility criteria and indicators. Madas and 
Zografos (2006:217)  
4.1.3 Results of policy compatibility assessment 
A panel of experts and key stakeholders was surveyed by Madas and 
Zografos (2006:219-222) using detailed survey instruments. Emphasis is 
placed in obtaining the perspectives and judgements of academic experts 
108 
 
 
and researchers, as well as aviation policy makers. The selection of individual 
experts has been made with view to the following: 
 Substantial expertise in existing slot allocation procedures; 
 Familiarity with the aviation industry developments in general and 
demand- capacity mismatch in particular; 
 Representation of various industry roles and viewpoints with respect to 
slot allocation.  
The experts were grouped as follows: 
 Expert Group 1: nineteen academic/research experts with substantial 
expertise in slot allocation or involvement in relevant policy studies; 
 Expert Group 2: ten experts from European airports or their 
associations expressing and promoting the airports’ perspectives and 
interests; 
 Expert Group 3: seven experts from European airlines with substantial 
presence in the European and/or their national airport networks. 
 Expert Group 4: five senior European policy makers in the slot 
allocation domain who are responsible either for the formulation of the 
slot allocation policy or the implementation and monitoring of the slot 
allocation process.   
Their observations and conclusion are drawn from the comparative analysis 
of airport clusters and synthesis of judgements among expert groups. The 
performance of the policy criteria does not vary substantially with airport 
cluster as indicated in Figure 4-2. The expert groups recognize the 
congestion problems and severe market distortion especially in busiest 
airports dominated by well-established carriers, thus placing higher 
importance on promoting the efficiency of the allocation process and 
eliminating market entry barriers. 
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The primary emphasis is placed on the efficiency of the slot allocation 
process that will potentially remedy the congestion problem and eliminate the 
imbalance between demand and supply along with their externalities (delays, 
noise and environmental concerns). The efficiency criterion constitutes by far 
the priority for all airport clusters that are congested or might become so in 
the near future. The expert groups converge on the finding that the 
implementation feasibility and complexity represent important aspects for the 
selection of a slot allocation strategy that will not compromise feasibility and 
realistic implementation in favour of increased efficiency. The acceptability 
aspects of the airport community are considered to have a lower priority as 
compared to efficiency and implementation.  
The cost criterion obtained the lowest importance rating in all airport clusters. 
This can be attributed to the fact that cost and complexity aspects are not an 
issue for the largest, busiest and most severely congested airports, which 
have already both the resources and the in-house expertise to deal with more 
complicated and costly slot allocation options if they promise higher 
efficiency. 
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Figure 4-2: Performance and ranking of policies per airport cluster. 
Madas and Zografos (2006:219) 
The efficiency criterion is assigned the highest importance rating in all airport 
clusters, but its importance gradually decreases by yielding ground to the 
implementation and acceptability criteria in the smaller (Cluster 3 and 4) 
airports. This is consistent with the empirical assumption that smaller national 
or regional airports mainly urge for the feasibility of implementation and the 
potential acceptance by the airport community even at the expense of 
efficiency. The cost, implementation and acceptability aspects gain increasing 
importance in smaller airports (Cluster 3 and 4), which may not have the 
financial resources or the in-house expertise to deal with more complicated or 
costly solutions. 
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Strat.4 (“Congestion Pricing”) has been generally considered as the most 
appropriate alternative for all airport clusters with respect to its compatibility 
with the identified policy as indicated in Figure 4-3.  Strat.4 introduces an 
“open” and adaptive slot allocation regime, which can be easily customized 
with the needs and characteristics of the local airport context through the 
appropriate congestion fee schemes. This allows the horizontal 
implementation of this strategy across all airport clusters. 
 
Figure 4-3: Performance and ranking of strategies per airport cluster. 
Madas and Zografos (2006:220) 
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Strat.5 (“Big Bang”) introduces the most radical departure from status quo on 
the grounds that it eliminates historic slot holding, it involves several drastic 
regulatory amendments, it is considered cumbersome in term of 
organizational and institutional arrangements, and introduces controversial 
allocation mechanism and rules. As a result, these progressive reforms were 
considered difficult to implement in large airports (clusters 1and 2) and 
impossible for smaller national airports (clusters 3 and 4). For similar reasons, 
more conservative strategies obtained better ranking in smaller airports 
(Cluster 3 and 4).  
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5 IMPEDIMENTS TO IMPLEMENTATING 
CONGESTION PRICING 
5.1 Background 
From Chapter 4, “Congestion Pricing” Strategy (Strat.4) has been identified 
as the most direct pricing method for addressing the mismatch between 
capacity and demand. This strategy is however not entirely “new”: it has been 
implemented without success both in the United Stated and in England. This 
section highlights the reasons why, despite being supported by theory, peak 
runway pricing has never been effectively implemented. 
5.2 Review of peak pricing implementation  
Schank (1994) investigates the impediments to implementation of peak 
pricing Boston Logan airport, New York (LaGuardia) and London (Heathrow). 
The following section describes the peak pricing mechanisms that were 
implemented and their outcomes. 
5.2.1 Boston Logan Airport 
Boston has proposed at least five pricing schemes intended to reduce 
congestion, and implemented two of those schemes since the 1980’s. Boston 
implemented a Program for Airfield Capacity Efficiency (PACE), which was 
not, strictly speaking, a peak pricing program as there was no distinction 
between any particular hours of the day. PACE simply changed the way the 
landing fees were assessed from a primarily weight-based formula. This was 
achieved by increasing the fixed cost for landings. Under PACE, a fixed cost 
of $91.00 per landing was assessed, plus $0.45/1000lbs for each aircraft.  
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The weight-based fee was recomputed every year to keep total revenues at 
the cost of airport operations. The fee was also computed with the intention of 
remaining revenue neutral and only accounting for the cost of the airport 
operations. Therefore, the fee in effect raises landing fees significantly for 
commuter and General Aviation (GA) aircraft while lowering fees significantly 
for larger commercial aircraft (Schank 1994:419). 
Table 5-1 indicates the differences in landing fees. The first three aircraft 
listed are all commuter aircrafts; the other three are jet aircraft. While the 
prices for the commuter aircraft tripled or quadrupled, the price for the jet 
aircraft in this example dropped significantly. The largest aircraft, the Boeing 
747-300, shows the greatest drop in price. 
 
Table 5-1: Example of price changes from Massport’s PACE initiative. 
Schank (2004:420)  
Smaller aircraft users, including commuter carriers and GA, challenged PACE 
in court, arguing that the new charges did not represent a fair allocation of 
costs to smaller aircraft users. They pointed out that PACE was intended and 
designed to exclude GA from the airport. The Administrative Law judge who 
reviewed the case found that PACE was “a system of airspace management 
and economic regulation using fees as its proxy”.  
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He argued that the fee structure was lacking in economic justification. The 
PACE structure was found to be discriminatory because there was no 
acceptable alternative airport for diverted users, and the fees were clearly 
designed to exclude certain users. As a result the Airport was forced to 
rescind PACE.  
According to Schank (1994:420), Boston was trying to find a way to charge 
more per operation because excess operations were causing congestion. The 
Court’s decision disagreed with their method of calculation. In part, this was 
because the Airport did not take into account the greater marginal costs 
imposed by larger aircraft, which require larger terminals, more airport 
personnel and a greater reserve of Fire Safety Rescue Operations. PACE 
illustrates the potential problems with making changes to pricing structures at 
airports. There are strong political interests that will fight such changes in 
court, especially if it appears that pricing initiatives are directed particularly at 
them.  
5.2.2 New York 
New York City has three major airports, John F. Kennedy International Airport 
(JFK), LaGuardia Airport (LGA) and Newark Airport (EWR), which are all 
operated by the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (PANYNJ). 
However, another airport that plays a large role in the regional airport system 
is Teterboro Airport (TEB) in New Jersey. This airport does not have any 
scheduled traffic service. It is used exclusively by GA.  
Despite the existence of TEB, the PANYNJ was facing increased airside 
congestion in the late 1960s and found that GA traffic at the three major 
airports accounted for 30 percent of the operations in peak hours and 25 
percent of operations overall. In response to this problem, they imposed peak 
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runway pricing system, with a $25 fee for all operations during peak hours by 
aircraft with 25 seats or less. The peak period was defined 8:00 to 10:00 in 
the morning Monday through Friday, and 3:00 to 8:00 in the evening every 
day. Exemptions were provided for GA aircraft operating as air taxis providing 
connections to operations at JFK and EWR, as long as a runway was used 
that was not in use by scheduled airlines.  
There were no exemptions at LGA because there were no such runways 
available during peak hours. The fee was explicitly targeted towards GA. The 
Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA) sued the PANYNJ over the 
new charges. A court dismissed the complaint and held that the fee was a 
justified means of relieving congestion. The court agreed that allocating 
scarce runway capacity in a manner that favours larger aircraft is legitimate 
and legal (Schank 1994:420). 
The court recognized that the PANYNJ had the “professed intention of 
influencing GA operators to transfer their operations where possible away 
from the runways and traffic control patterns at the three major airports during 
peak traffic periods”. However, given the adequacy of TEB as an alternative 
airport for GA, and limited facilities for air service in the region, the court 
found that it was reasonable for the Port Authority to give priority to mass 
transportation services. The court found that the fee was not discriminatory 
because even though it was targeted at a specific group of aircraft, PANYNJ 
had the right to differentiate among different kinds of flights. The New York 
case, like the Boston case, is not strictly speaking an example of peak pricing 
theory applied to practice, since prices were never set close to marginal cost 
and pricing was not market-based but rather directed at one particular group 
of airport users. 
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The Port Authority intended to direct pricing at general aviation and later 
commuter aircraft. The strategy appears to have been effective in reducing 
the congestion caused by GA aircraft; however, the Port Authority could 
never have implemented such a policy without the presence of TBE. This GA 
airport provided an alternative for those who did not wish to pay the extra fees 
installed at the major New York airports. Conversely, the commuter fee was 
too small to have forced any major changes in commuter airlines schedule, 
and the PANYNJ cannot raise it to an effective level because there would be 
no other alternative for the commuter aircraft. 
The fact that an alternative existed is the key point. Pricing theory does not 
account for the passengers who are diverted as a result of the new pricing 
structure. In New York, there is what was determined by the courts to be an 
adequate alternative for GA aircraft. However, if TBE did not exist, New York 
would have run into the same problem as Boston in their attempt to target 
one group of aircraft to dissuade them from landing at their congested airport. 
There was no TBE equivalent for commuter aircraft out of its congested 
airports. The above illustrates the importance of considering the alternatives 
available when trying to reduce airport congestion through pricing (Schank 
1994:421). 
5.2.3 London 
BAA introduced peak pricing by imposing a distance and per passenger 
element to the weight-based fee plus a surcharge on operations that varied 
with season and time of day. The distance element of the fee was based on 
the ability to pay and charges more for longer flights. Flights were divided into 
three categories: domestic, European and international, with international 
flights charged the most per ton and per passenger and domestic flights 
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charged the least. The passenger and weight elements of the fee structure 
were based on the ability to pay but the peak element was not.  
The peak element of the new pricing strategy charged £20 per operation 
between the hours of 8:00 and 11:59 in the morning. The fee structure was 
later modified, and a £50 charge was applied to the peak of the peak, while 
the £20 charge was applied to the shoulder (Schank 2004:422). 
A number of changes have been made to this initial pricing structure virtually 
every year since it was implemented. Table 5-2 indicates the frequent 
changes to the fee structure at Heathrow and suggests how difficult it was for 
BAA to arrive at a pricing structure that worked. Throughout all these 
changes, several airlines sued BAA. 
 
Table 5-2: Significant changes in Heathrow pricing structure, 1972-1984. 
Schank (2004:422)  
American carriers complained about the BAA charges for Heathrow because 
of their distinction between international and European flights. This distinction 
was removed and distance differentials were also removed.  
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However, a significant increase in landing fees along with a greater focus on 
peak charges for all airlines accompanied these changes. Pan American 
Airlines sued BAA over the new fee structure, and eighteen other airlines 
formed a “British Airport Users Action Group” and refused to pay the higher 
fees. The core of the problem was that US carriers felt as if they had no 
choice but to land at peak times when charges were highest. 
BAA attempted to prove their case by showing how the increased fees were 
calculated to pay for improved facilities. They carried out an analysis of the 
marginal costs incurred at Heathrow. The results indicated that the marginal 
cost of operating a flight in the peak at Heathrow was £125 and £50 at other 
times. This was substantially greater than the price being charged at the time. 
Table 5-3 indicates that there was a diminished use of smaller aircraft at 
Heathrow following these policy changes, although it is unclear whether this 
change was necessarily related to airport landing fees.  
BAA’s pricing policy targeted both large and small aircraft operators. The 
policy was originally intended to smooth out the peak, primarily caused by 
large aircraft heading to and from the US, but it eventually impacted 
commuter carriers who could not afford to pay the landing fees. This latter 
effect was the original intent of most of the policies in Boston. The pricing 
scheme was used to target specific groups, who did their best to fight the 
policy and were successful in reducing its impact to some degree. 
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Table 5-3: Use of Heathrow by smaller aircraft, 1984-1993. Schank 
(2004:423)  
It was commuter aircraft, for which there existed alternative transportation 
options (Stansted Airport and rail), that became the group that could not 
defeat the pricing system. Targeting a group with available alternatives 
worked for BAA, while targeting a group without them did not (Schank 
2004:423). 
The above demonstrates the difficulty of effectively implementing peak pricing 
for airport runways. The two main problems identified are: political and social 
equity; and the problem of displaced passengers. Schank (2004:424) 
suggests that for peak runway pricing to be implemented effectively, there 
needs to be an alternative mode of transport provided to accommodate 
displaced passengers.  
Since its inception in 1994, ACSA has made significant investment in 
modernising existing infrastructure and in additional capacity at ORTIA. This 
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investment was made in response to growing passenger traffic, cargo and 
aircraft movements, amongst other things. ACSA uses the IATA slot 
coordination methodology to allocate and manage runway slots at ORTIA. 
This approach has been proved through research to have significant flaws 
when it comes to efficiently allocating scarce airport slots. Major airports in 
the United States and Europe have come up with strategies aimed at 
improving the efficiency of slot allocation.  
The strategies adopted at these airports are aimed at the adoption of market-
driven slot allocation mechanisms such as slot trading, congestion pricing and 
auctions. There are also calls for an integrated approach to the airport 
congestion problem.  
From chapter 4, a study conducted by Madas and Zografos (2006), aimed at 
determining the optimal slot allocation strategy for various airport types; 
ORTIA would be classified under Cluster two “large international hubs”. The 
results of this study indicate that for ORTIA, the most appropriate slot 
allocations strategy is the “Congestion Pricing” Strategy (Strat.4).  
However, the above section highlights the fundamental reasons why, despite 
being supported by theory, peak runway pricing has never been effectively 
implemented. The literature suggests High Speed Rail as a possible 
adequate substitute for air travel in a complementary manner. However, 
Schank (2004) points out that in most of the world outside of Western Europe 
and Japan, there are few adequate ground transportation alternatives outside 
of the private automobile. 
 According to National Transport Master 2050 (NATMAP 2050a 2010: 6-10) 
South Africa’s rail network of 30 000 kilometres was once recognised 
internationally as the most comprehensive and best maintained in the entire 
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African Continent. This has however changed over the years as a result of a 
systematic and gradual decline in network coverage, a closure of lines and 
decreasing traffic volumes on a range of products and trip distances that are 
typical rail associated traffic, together with a lack of new global rail standards 
and technologies. 
A number of reasons have been given for the deterioration of the railway 
network over the years. Management inefficiencies and competitive 
ineffectiveness; governance obstacles and disinvestment over a long period 
of time; natural market forces and the monopolistic character of rail in South 
Africa, are reasons identified. Other external contributing factors have also 
been debated; such as an ample supply of road capacity, together with 
incorrect road use pricing and the lack of technical regulation of road traffic 
(NATMAP 2050b 2010:6-10). 
To address the shortcomings in rail, NATMAP 2050b (2010:12-13) 
recommend that: a position paper be formulated that defines the future policy 
on the rail mode and an action plan and program for implementation; the 
potential of some shorter distance air services that could perhaps be better 
and cheaper served by high speed rail systems be investigated. Candidates 
in this respect are between Johannesburg and Limpopo, Nelspruit, 
Bloemfontein and Durban; and around the coast line between Cape Town, 
George, Port Elizabeth, East London and Durban.  
 
 
 
 
123 
 
 
6 EXISTING AIRPORT FACILITIES  
6.1 Background 
This section gives an overall view of the existing infrastructure at ORTIA. It 
further outlines ACSA’s runway capacity development strategy. ACSA was 
established under the terms of the Airports Company Act (1993) to own and 
operate the infrastructure of the previously State-Owned Airports within the 
Republic of South Africa. ACSA currently owns and operates nine airports in 
South Africa. The three main airports, O. R. Tambo International Airport 
(ORTIA) in Johannesburg, Cape Town International Airport (CPT), King 
Shaka International Airport (KSIA) in Durban are together responsible for 
approximately 90 percent of all airport passenger volume in the Country. 
ORTIA alone handles 54 percent of the Country’s total passengers and 81 
percent of total air cargo traffic.  
Figure 6-1 indicates the location of ACSA’s three biggest airports. These 
airports are situated in the country’s most densly populated areas. ACSA is a 
monopoly, therefore, the Airports Company Act (1993) provides for the 
establishment of a Govenmental Regulatory Committee within the 
Department of Transport to regulate ACSA from abusing its market position. 
The country has an active and morden aviation system with services to 
international, regional and domestic destinations. (ACSA Annual Report 
2010). As in most cases worldwide, ACSA’s economic regulatory framework 
prescribes the “Single Till” approah  to airport revenue.   
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Figure 6-1: Location of South Africa’s three main airports. Statistics 
South Africa (2000) 
6.2 Passenger flows 
6.2.1 International passenger flows 
ORTIA is predominantly the international gateway to SA and handled 
approximately 7.5 million international passengers in year 2010. This figure is 
equivalent to 84 percent of total international traffic to SA (ACSA 2010). 
6.2.2 Regional passenger flows    
ORTIA acts as a primary hub for Sub-Saharan traffic with a significant 
number of inbound passengers transiting through ORTIA and continuing their 
journey to neighboring countries. The throughput of regional traffic at ACSA’s 
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airports is 2.9 percent of the total with 90 percent transiting through ORTIA 
(ACSA 2010). 
6.2.3 Domestic passenger flows   
Two thirds of all the traffic handled by ACSA airports in year 2010 was 
domestic. This is an unsually high propotion of total passenger throughput, 
but is explained by the fact that the major cites of South Africa are located at  
considerable distances from each other. Therefore, this has made air travel a 
prefered mode of transport (Mott-McDonald 2010). According to Mott-
McDonald (2010), this feature can be reffered to as “the tyranny of distance”, 
where air transport becomes a vital link for social and economic development, 
as alternative surface transport modes are unsuitable to or are incovenient 
and incapable of achieving the same level of mobility for both people and 
trade. Figure 6-2 indicates the domestic air routes in SA. 
 
Figure 6-2: Domestic air routes in South Africa. 
(www.travelwithinsouthafrica.co.za) 
126 
 
 
6.3 Existing runway facilities 
Figure 6-3 from the Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP) published by 
the South African Civil Aviation Authority (SACAA), indicates in diagrammatic 
form the primary arrangement of runways, taxiways, aircraft stands and other 
facilities at ORTIA. ORTIA has two parrallel runways which are offset by  
1 870 meters. From Figure 6-3, the longest runway on the west side is 
designated 03L/21R and is 4 418 meters long by 60 meters wide. Runways 
03L, 03R and 21L have a Catergory II Instrument Landing System Approach 
with a stardard three degree glidepath angle. At present, Runway 21R only 
has a instrument approach guided by the VOR/DME radio navigation beacon 
located to the south of the runway on the extended centerline. 
The Aerodrome elevation is 1 694 meters above mean sea level, which along 
with ambient temperatures makes this runway system “hot and high”, 
requiring much longer than normal take-off runway distances. Runway 
03L/21R which is the longest and closet to the terminal area is the prefered 
runway for take-off. The secondary runway on the east side is designated 
03R/21L and is 3 400 meters long and 60 meters wide. The secondary 
runway is used exclusively for landing. The runways operate in the 
northbound (03) direction approximately 70% of the time (Mott-McDonald 
2010).   
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Figure 6-3: ORTIA aerodrome chart. SACAA (2007) 
6.4 Airspace issues 
According to Mott-McDonald (2010), there are a number of airspace controls 
in the Johannesburg area that have the potential to limit the number of aircraft 
movements which can be accommodated at ORTIA. In order to safely control 
the air traffic in the Johannesburg area, ORTIA sits at the centre of a Special 
Rules Area (SRA) which extends for a radius of approximately 75 kilometres 
around the airport. This also covers all other aerodromes in the 
Johannesburg area see Figure 6-4.  
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Figure 6-4: Johannesburg “Special Rules Area”. SACAA (2009) 
AFB Waterkloof (FAWK) is a military airport located roughly thirty kilometres 
north of ORTIA. See Figure 6-5 for FAWK’s aerodrome chart. A major 
concern regarding FAWK is that the South African Air Force has installed an 
Instrument Landing System (ILS) on runway 01 and proposes to add ILS 
training movements to their existing aircraft movements. ATNS have objected 
to this on the grounds that it will reduce ORTIA movements due to potential 
conflicts. All south bound approaches to either of ORTIA’s runways must 
commence in the FAWK’ Terminal Manoeuvring Area. Figure 6-6 indicates 
the ORTIA southbound ILS approach.   
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Figure 6-5: Waterkloof Aerodrome Chart. SACAA (2005)  
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Figure 6-6: ORTIA Southbound ILS Approach. SACAA (2007) 
Grand Central (FAGC) is a relatively small airfield located sixteen kilometres 
to the North West of ORTIA. It is primarily used for general aviation. Rand 
Airport (FAGM) is located thirteen kilometres to the South West of ORTIA. Its 
location has significant impact to northbound approaches to and southbound 
departures from ORTIA.  
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Lanseria International Airport (FALA) is located 38 kilometres to the 
Northwest of ORTIA. Aircraft fly over FALA on approach to ORTIA from the 
Northwest. Its main runway is orientated approximately perpendicular to the 
direction of over-flights to and from ORTIA. It has a second close parallel 
runway which is mostly used for small General Aviation (GA) aircraft. Until 
recently, there were no scheduled flights at FALA. In 2009 Kulula, a “low cost” 
operator began scheduled operations from FALA. There are no conflicts 
between ORTIA operations and the FALA airspace. However, this is the 
second busiest airport in the region and movements at this airport can be 
delayed by movements in the remaining airspace primarily those in or out of 
ORTIA (Mott-McDonald 2010). 
6.5 Current ORTIA Master Plan 
In 2006, ACSA initiated a process of updating the Master Plan of ORTIA and 
appointed NACO-SSI Airport Consultants to assist in the process. The ORTIA 
Master Plan was completed in 2007 and approved by the Board of ACSA. 
According to ACSA’s ORTIA Master Plan (2007), the future direction of the 
ORTIA development plan involves a series of key capacity enhancements: 
 Lengthening runway 03R/21L to 4 400 metres; 
 The addition of a second 4 400 metres close parallel runway on the 
east side of runway 03R/21L designated 03RR/21LL; 
 The addition of a second 3 500 metre close parallel runway on the east 
side of runway 03L/21R designated 03C/21C, which would be shorter 
than the other three runways. 
 The development of a midfield apron and terminal complex both for 
passenger and cargo with a new surface access and landside area to 
the south; 
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 Landside and airside passenger and road connections between the 
new midfield terminal and the existing Western Precinct. 
Figure 6-7 depicts runway designations at ORTIA.  
 
Figure 6-7: Proposed runway designations at ORTIA. ACSA (2007) 
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Figure 6-8: ORTIA Ultimate Master Plan layout. ACSA (2007) 
6.6 Runway development strategy  
The proposed runway development at ORTIA is expected to have significant 
land and financial impacts. In 2007, it was estimated that 1057 privately 
owned sites would need to be acquired at a total cost of roughly R1.3 billion 
in order to accommodate the proposed runway developments. Figure 6-9 
depicts the properties to be acquired for the runway developments. Figure 6-8 
depicts the preferred runway layout with its associated land-use whilst Table 
6-1 indicates the capacity gains from the additional runways. From Table 6-1, 
the declared capacity of the existing runway system under IMC is 60 
movements per hour. The declared capacity will be increase by the 
introduction of a third runway and the extension of the existing secondary 
runway by 1 400m to 88 movements per hour under IMC. The addition of a 
fourth runway will increase the capacity to 106 movements per hour under 
IMC.  
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Table 6-1: Runway development capacities. ATNS (2008)  
 
Figure 6-9: Close parallel centre and close parallel east. ACSA (2006)  
The current Master Plan assumes marginal administrative demand 
management. This is achieved by assuming a slower growth in peak demand 
over time and that traffic will eventually fill the off peak periods. The Master 
Plan makes provision for only an infrastructure response to congestion (it 
considers only the supply side).  
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The major South African Cities (Cape Town, Johannesburg and Durban) are 
located far apart compared to European cities. This has lead to the 
assumption that only air travel is a mode of transport to link them. From the 
literature review, HSR could be a viable alternative between Johannesburg 
and Durban. FALA could play a significant role in the overall capacity plan for 
the region, although its potential contribution is not fully addressed in the 
ORTIA Master Plan.  
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7 CASE STUDY 
7.1 Background 
This chapter describes the impact of the approaches discussed in the 
literature on runway congestion at ORTIA. The literature indicates that 
capacity gains through the construction of new airports or the expansion of 
existing facilities are considerably expensive; have long lead time; are subject 
to social and political objections. Furthermore, these negatives are more 
pronounced in respect of runway developments than any other airport sub-
system. This research report, therefore, focuses on non-infrastructure 
interventions aimed at enhancing the capacity of the runway system. 
The demand for access to the runway system at ORTIA is expected to 
continue to grow from the current peak demand of 51 movements to 
approximately 80 peak hour movements by year 2022. Demand is expected 
to also start “filling-up” the low demand hours of the day between 07:00 in the 
morning till 19:00 in the evening. Similarly to other international airports, 
ORTIA has distinct morning and evening peaks. These peaks are driven by: 
international arrivals; domestic and regional departure in the morning and 
international departure; domestic and regional arrivals in the evening. The 
average demand in between the peak periods is expected to grow from an 
average 40 movements to approximately 65 movements by year 2022. 
To accommodate the expected demand, ACSA plans to invest in excess of 
R3 billion on a new runway and associated taxiways and navigational aids. 
The new runway will be accompanied by a 1000 meter northward extension 
of the existing secondary runway. 
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A fourth runway is planned beyond year 2022. To accommodate these 
developments, ACSA will need to acquire extensive privately owned land 
within the vicinity of ORTIA.  
Although in the long term, the need to construct new runways cannot be 
completely removed, the literature review identifies four basic alternative 
approaches that relieve runway congestion and defer the need for new 
runways in the short to medium term as: collaborative decision making; 
technological improvements; air and rail integration; and demand 
management. The effectiveness of each approach in addressing runway 
congestion and its implementation challenges are evaluated.  
7.2 Collaborative decision making      
Collaborative decision making (CDM) focuses on the flow of information 
amongst various airport stakeholders within the airport environment. Since its 
introduction at ORTIA, on-time performance has improved and the average 
delay per aircraft movement has been reduced. This has improved the 
utilisation of allocated slots.  Additional efficiencies could be achieved if the 
full potential of CDM is utilised. Stakeholder participation in CDM at ORTIA is 
achieved through the Airport Management Centre (AMC) and is currently 
voluntary. ATNS, the main stakeholder in runway and airspace management 
does not have full-time representation at the AMC. With ATNS’s participation 
in CDM, potential delays could be identified and communicated in real time 
and mitigating action taken to avoid delays. The overall utilisation of slots and 
hence the overall capacity of the airport could be improved.  
ACSA has implemented the AMC concept in its three major airports (ORTIA, 
KSIA and CPT), therefore, no additional capital expenditure is required to 
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implement CDM. A policy decision is required to compel all relevant 
stakeholders to have full time representation in the AMC. 
7.3 Technological improvements    
ATNS employs out-dated technology to manage air and ground aircraft 
movements. This has forced ATNS to: assign conservative arrival and 
departure horizontal and vertical separations; limit their ability to sequence 
arrivals and departure aircraft; limit their ability to mix arrival and departure 
movements on a single runway. With these modifications, the declared 
capacity of the runway system can possibly be increased from the current 58 
movements to between 70 and 80 movements per hour. This could defer the 
need for additional runway capacity to beyond 2022. 
For these measures to be implemented, financial resource are required to 
update ATNS facilities and to train Air Traffic Controllers. This cost is 
considerably less than the cost of building additional runways; has lower 
social and political implications; and could be implemented in a relatively 
short period of time compared to building new runways.  
7.4 Air and rail integration 
The substitution of short haul flight with rail is not feasible at ORTIA currently. 
South Africa’s major cities are much further apart compared to their European 
counterparts where air and rail integration has been implemented. South 
Africa’s railway network is under-developed, poorly maintained, designed to 
lower standard that does not allow High Speed Rail Operations and has an 
aging rolling stock. 
The required capital investment to facilitate air and rail integration is 
significantly higher than the investment required build additional runway 
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capacity at ORTIA. It will also take significantly longer to upgrade and expand 
the rail infrastructure than to build additional runways at ORTIA. 
7.5 Demand management  
Chapter 4 describes the suitability of various demand management strategies 
for different airport settings and policies. From chapter 4, strategy 4 is 
regarded as the most suitable for airports the size of ORTIA, this strategy 
entails the introduction of an “open” and adaptive slot allocation regime, 
which can be customized with the needs and characteristics of the local 
airport context through congestion fee schemes. Under strategy 4, 
“grandfather” rights are abandoned and a congestion based scheme is set by 
an administrative authority in the form of a three-point tariff including: the 
traditional weight based fees and passenger surcharges; a flat reservation fee 
applied per movement in the form of membership dues or “no-show” 
penalties; and a congestion based fee with fees varying with congestion 
throughout the day. 
This strategy advocates for “grandfather” rights to be abandoned, however, 
no guidance is provided on how best to allocate slots. In section 2.6.2, slot 
allocation based on “grandfather” rights has been identified as a contributing 
factor to the inefficient utilisation of runway slots. However, current slot 
holders are unlikely to accept the abandonment of “grandfather” rights 
because they have invested considerable resources developing routes 
associated with the slots; furthermore, slots provide a competitive advantage 
for the slot holder. 
There are important questions relating to slot allocation that need to be 
answered if strategy 4 is to be effectively implemented: firstly, how to deal 
with existing slots holders; secondly how to allocate existing unallocated 
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slots; and lastly how to deal with slots that become available due to reduction 
in demand.  
A possible solution to the slot allocation problem is to leave the slots already 
allocated unchanged. Provided that the congestion fee is set sufficiently high, 
this would compel existing slot holders to release any slots they consider non-
profitable to other airlines. The existing slot holders are likely to oppose such 
a move as it will enable competition on their most profitable routes. 
Unallocated slots and any slots that become available due to reduction in 
demand can be placed in a slot pool and allocated on a first come first served 
basis. For this method to work, the congestion fee will need to be revised 
regularly to ensure that it is not excessively high and drive away too much 
traffic from the peak on the one hand and that it is not too low to encourage 
airlines to hold on to slots simply to prevent other airlines from entering the 
market. 
From chapter 5, one of the impediments to the implementation of congestion 
pricing is the unavailability of either an alternative mode of transport or a 
suitable airport for those passengers who will likely be “displaced” by the 
implementation of congestion pricing.  In South Africa, minimal integration 
exists between the various modes of transport and furthermore, major cities 
are much further apart compared to European cities where modal integration 
has been achieved. This makes air the preferred mode for intercity travel. 
For congestion pricing to be effectively implemented at ORTIA, an alternative 
airport in close proximity to ORTIA is required to accommodate the 
“displaced” passengers. From 6.4, there are three airports in close proximity 
to ORTIA: FALA, FAGC and FAWF. FAWF is a military base with airspace 
conflicts with ORTIA. FAGC is privately owned and is used exclusively for 
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GA. FALA is privately owned and used by both GA and scheduled traffic. The 
scheduled traffic that utilises FALA is the “low cost carrier”. Some of the 
reasons given by the “low cost carriers” for moving some of their operations 
from ORTIA to FALA are that FALA offers lower airport charges and shorter 
aircraft turnaround times compared to ORTIA. Short aircraft turnaround times 
are achievable at FALA because there are no congestion related delays.  
Amongst the three airports, FALA is best suited to accommodate the 
displaced passengers because it already accommodates traffic that is looking 
for an alternative to ORTIA. There are a number of issues that need to be 
addressed if FALA is to play a meaningful role in the air traffic network:  
FALA is a relatively small airport, so if additional traffic is to be diverted there, 
significant investment in upgrading facilities and capacity expansion needs to 
be made. FALA is a privately owned entity and may not be able to generate 
sufficient revenue to fund the required capital expenditure. If the Department 
of Transport (DOT) considers FALA an integral part of South Africa’s air 
transport network, the Department could enter into a Public Private 
Partnership and share the development costs with FALA. ACSA could 
acquire FALA and incorporate it in the overall air traffic master plan for the 
region as a reliever airport for ORTIA. This move is likely be opposed by 
some stakeholders who view FALA as an alternative to ORTIA offering lower 
airport fees and virtually no delays.       
The two airports (ORTIA and FALA) are roughly 40 km apart. Ground 
transportation linkage needs to be provided. There is a system of freeways 
linking the airports; however, because of the distance between the airports 
and a possible high number of passengers connecting between them, a road 
link may not be viable. Congestion on the roads will lead to delayed flights 
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and missed connections. Because of the low traffic volumes at FALA 
presently, there is almost no requirement for a link between the two airports 
and they operate entirely independent of each other. Airlines are able to 
segregate passenger who originate and land at FALA from those who require 
connections at ORTIA. A rail link would be a better option; however, the 
economic, social, political and environmental costs of an additional runway at 
ORTIA would be significantly lower that the cost of building a rail link between 
the two airports. The railway link may also take significantly longer to build 
than an additional runway. 
The current traffic demand profile at ORTIA where peak demand does not as 
yet exceed the declared capacity is not suitable for “full” implementation of 
peak pricing. The literature review recommends that peak pricing be gradually 
phased in as the demand approached capacity. 
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8 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS   
The current demand on the runway system at ORTIA is insufficient to justify 
implementing drastic demand management measures.  The demand, 
however, is expected to exceed the existing runway capacity by 2017, 
resulting in increased aircraft delays and congestion.  The current delays 
experienced at ORTIA are not as a result of insufficient capacity, but rather 
are as a result of inclement weather and operational inefficiencies. The 
planned runway developments can be deferred beyond 2022 by improving 
operational efficiency through CDM; increasing the declared capacity of the 
existing runway system by making a significantly lower investment in 
technology through ATNS and Air Traffic Controller Training.  These 
measures can be implemented in a relatively short period of time. Strategy 4 
“congestion pricing” can be gradually phased in over a period of time from 
2015 onwards. 
Further research work needs to be conducted on: setting the initial congestion 
fee to be levied and periods which the fee will be levied; Integrating FALA in 
regional air traffic network in terms of its role and ownership; treatment of 
additional revenue generated through congestion pricing in the economic 
regulatory framework. Alternative ground linkage between ORTIA and FALA. 
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